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Key Points:
•	 Despite adjustments over its lifetime, the contemporary international drug control regime 
has had an historical emphasis in on ‘narcotic’ drugs, such as opium, heroin and cocaine, 
rather than on a range of synthetic substances. 
•	 Associated policy inertia has resulted in disproportionate attention on counter-narcotic 
policies and operations in the Global South and in many ways inadequate responses to the 
synthetic market, including production that is frequently located in the Global North.  
•	 Possible explanations for this focus on plant-based drugs are manifold and complex.  They 
include the fact that the control regime began with concerns over opium-smoking in the 
‘orient’, a concentration of drug crops in the Global South, the energies of colonialism 
(which have been intimately tied up with ‘drug wars’), broader geo-political imperatives 
and the focus of policy metrics on drug crops.  
•	 The market for synthetic drugs has grown exponentially in recent years, becoming the 
second-most illicit drugs consumed after cannabis. In 2014, the UN estimated that there 
were 35.7 million users of amphetamine type stimulants (including prescription stimulants), 
and 19.4 million users of ecstasy. These synthetic drugs outstripped the estimated totals of 
opioids and cocaine combined. 
•	 Alongside this consumption is that of New Psychoactive Substances that fall outside the 
control regime and its schedules, which the regime is now attempting to integrate into 
national and international controls. 
•	 While there was some awareness of the advent of new synthetic drugs in the aftermath of 
the Second World War and since the 1960s, it is only over recent years, and especially in the 
wake of the 2016 UNGASS in New York, that a truly serious understanding of the challenges 
posed by proliferating synthetic drugs has begun to emerge from the international drug 
control regime.  
•	 This is timely since, considering its policy history and contemporary dynamics, it is now 
time to reframe the narrative surrounding the way the international community deals with 
synthetic drugs.
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2INTRODUCTION 
History has, in many ways, deflected attention 
away from the issue of synthetic drugs. 
Governments and the overarching UN based 
international control structures above them 
have tended instead to traditionally focus their 
attentions on organic drugs and semi-synthetic 
substances derived from narcotic plants, such 
as opium, morphine, heroin, cannabis, coca and 
cocaine. It is important to acknowledge that 
there has been some, arguably unavoidable, 
movement in recent years.  Nonetheless, 
despite the scale and harm associated with 
the contemporary market in synthetics, inertia 
continues to afflict those structures responsible 
for developing appropriate policy responses. 
Beginning with an overview of the synthetics 
market, this Policy Report examines the possible 
sources of such inertia and critically explores 
the issues underlying what in many respects 
represents a key yet largely under discussed 
feature of the extant international drug control 
system.  It is argued here that, considering its 
policy history and contemporary dynamics, it is 
now time to reframe the narrative surrounding 
the way the international community deals 
with synthetic drugs.
As will be discussed there are several possible 
reasons for the emphasis on narcotics 
demonstrated by the international control 
architecture – a legal framework currently based 
on three almost universally accepted UN drug 
control treaties and the work of their associated 
treaty bodies.  These include the historical 
trajectory of drug control, which began with 
concerns surrounding the smoking of opium in 
China and the ‘Far East’, and was built largely 
around opioids; the concentration of drug crops 
in the global south, where colonial projects and 
proxy wars have since continued investing their 
energy across much of the twentieth century; 
and the focus of metrics on the cultivation of 
these drug crops, which give the appearance 
of being easy to measure, in contrast to the 
more mobile and dynamic synthetic substances 
which can be readily produced in ‘kitchen 
labs’ and industrial facilities across the globe. 
These considerations will be examined in the 
following pages. First, however, it is necessary 
to introduce the current international policy 
environment and the dimensions of the market 
for synthetic drugs.
The 2016 Special Session of the UN General 
Assembly (UNGASS) on the world drug problem, 
amongst its many other features, brought the 
question of Amphetamine Type Stimulants 
(a group of drugs whose principle members 
include amphetamine and methamphetamine, 
but also other substances like MDMA – Ecstasy 
– and methcathinone)  and New Psychoactive 
Substances further into the foreground of 
international drug policy than previous Special 
Sessions had done. In the words of the UNGASS 
Outcome Document, ‘We resolve to strengthen 
national and international action to address 
the emerging challenge of new psychoactive 
substances, including their adverse health 
consequences, and the evolving threat of 
amphetamine-type stimulants’.1 According 
to the United Nations Office on Drugs and 
Crime (UNODC) Global SMART (Synthetics 
Monitoring, Analyses, Reporting and Trends) 
Programme Update for 2016, the UNGASS 
Outcome Document both reflects and enhances 
awareness of synthetic drugs for Parties to 
the drug control treaties. More precisely, it 
notes, ‘Pursuant to the Outcome Document 
of the 2016 United Nations General Assembly 
Special Session on the World Drug Problem 
(UNGASS) entitled “Our joint commitment 
to effectively addressing and countering the 
world drug problem”, heads of States and 
Government have recognised the importance 
of reinforcing national and international 
efforts and increasing global cooperation to 
respond to the challenges and threats of NPS 
and amphetamine type stimulants.’2
To be sure, the synthetic market has emerged 
recently as a vibrant sector of the illicit drug 
trade. According to the 2016 World Drug Report 
there were an estimated 19.4 million ecstasy 
users and 35.7 million users of amphetamine 
type stimulants (ATS) and prescription stimulants 
3in 2014, the last year for which statistical data 
is available. This makes synthetics the second 
most commonly used illicit drugs3 after the 
perennially popular cannabis, with the number 
of ATS and Ecstasy users outstripping the 
estimated number of cocaine and opioid4 users 
combined.5 In alarming tones, the preface to 
the UNODC’s 2013 World Drug Report sets out 
that ATS use: ‘remains widespread globally, and 
appears to be increasing in most regions’, and 
with crystalline methamphetamine presents 
‘an imminent threat.’  However, it is significant 
that the Preface to the 2016 World Drug Report 
draws attention to ‘the alarming rise in heroin 
use in some regions’, and notes that, ‘while 
the challenges posed by new psychoactive 
substances remain a serious concern, heroin 
continues to be the drug that kills the most 
people’.6 So, despite the swelling availability 
of synthetic drugs, opioids continue to play an 
important role on the market, as they have 
since the inception of the control system. 
Like every narrative that attempts to deal in 
a balanced way with the vexed and complex 
realities driving drug policy, then, this report 
will offer no easy answers.
Alongside the growth of ATS manufacture 
and demand has been the emergence of New 
Psychoactive Substances (NPS) or ‘legal highs’ 
that fall outside of the control system. The UK 
recently initiated a proposal to schedule the 
NPS mephedrone under the international drug 
control regime, and the substance became 
the first to be internationally controlled at the 
2015 Commission on Narcotic Drugs (CND), the 
UN’s central policy making body on the issue, 
following a review and recommendation by 
the WHO.7 An estimated 8% of the 15-24 age 
group in the European Union are experimenting 
with NPS according to a 2014 Eurobarometer 
survey,8 with Ireland at the highest level (22% 
having consumed NPS at some point), followed 
by Spain and Slovenia (13% each) and France 
(12%). Young people in Ireland, Spain and 
France are the most likely to have used NPS 
during the previous twelve months (5% each).9 
Outside of Europe, a 2012 UNODC survey found 
East and South-East Asia10 to be the second 
largest reporting region for NPS consumption. 
Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the USA 
also reported increased lifetime prevalence 
rates for NPS in 2010-12 youth surveys, although 
with preferences expressed for different types 
of NPS (Ketamine in Australia, salvia divinorum 
in Canada, piperazines (BZP) in New Zealand 
and synthetic cannabinoids in the US).11 
The dynamism of the NPS sector is reflected in 
the most recent data constructed by the SMART 
programme, which included the statement that, 
‘By December 2015, over 644 NPS had been 
reported by 102 countries to UNODC, showing 
a stark and unprecedented increase in NPS 
emergence since 2008.’  As the International 
Narcotics Control Board (INCB), the watchdog 
of the UN drug control treaty system, observed 
in its annual report for 2015, ‘As at October 
2015, the UNODC early warning advisory on new 
psychoactive substances, which monitors the 
emergence of new psychoactive substances as 
reported by Member States, had identified 602 
unique substances, a 55 per cent increase from 
the 388 substances reported in October 2014.’ 
These figures are higher than the total number 
of substances under international control (234). 
Reflecting on the challenges posed by NPS, the 
2013 World Drug Report (WDR) had set out that: 
 
While the existing international control 
system is equipped to deal with the 
emergence of new substances that 
pose a threat to public health, it is 
currently required to provide a response 
commensurate with the unprecedented fast 
evolving nature of the phenomenon of new 
psychoactive substances.
The vitality of synthetic drug markets poses 
challenging questions for the treaty framework 
that underpins international drug control; both 
for the UNODC that oversees and administers 
the system and for the ideology of prohibition 
that has informed control efforts for the last one 
hundred years. Rather than progressing toward 
a ‘drug free world’, or even significant reduction 
4of drug manufacture and consumption as set 
out at the 1998 UN General Assembly Special 
Session on the world drug problem, and in the 
most recent UNGASS of 2016 whose Outcome 
Document reaffirmed ‘our determination to 
tackle the world drug problem and to actively 
promote a society free of drug abuse’,12 the 
UNODC has presided over an expansion and 
diversification of contemporary drug markets 
driven by synthetics. 
Moreover, although now citing ‘serious’ and 
‘imminent’ dangers posed by ATS and NPS, a 
historical emphasis on plant-based ‘narcotic’ 
drugs has left drug control institutions without 
an adequate evidence base for developing 
policies to respond to synthetics markets. As 
acknowledged by the UNODC in its thematic 
chapter on NPS in the World Drug Report 2013:
 
NPS have been reported in a number of 
countries in recent years. What is actually 
known today, however, may be just the tip 
of the iceberg, as systematic studies on 
the spread of NPS do not exist. The limited 
information available suggests that their 
spread is far from negligible…13
Parallel statements in relation to the paucity 
of qualitative and quantitative ATS data 
are to be found in the reports of the Global 
SMART Program.14  The Update for 2016, 
meanwhile, recognizes that ‘(t)he detection 
and identification of NPS are critical to 
supply reduction, data collection, health 
interventions and form the basis of effective 
drug policy responses’.15
The relative absence of high quality 
epidemiological information renders it unlikely 
that effective interventions to minimise the 
harm caused by synthetics can be devised, or 
the growth of ATS, MDMA and NPS markets 
contained. This situation risks reactive 
policy initiatives that cause more harm than 
good, while further calling into question the 
feasibility of the international community’s 
goal to ‘minimize and, eventually, eliminate 
the availability and use of illicit drugs’16 by the 
current target date of 2019. As set out by Yury 
Fedotov, Executive Director of the UNODC, in 
his introduction to the 2013 World Drug report: 
We have to admit that, globally, the 
demand for drugs has not been substantially 
reduced and that some challenges exist in 
the implementation of the drug control 
system [..] in the fast-evolving nature of 
new psychoactive substances.’
Further, in a conference room paper circulated 
at the 59th Commission on Narcotic Drugs in 
2016, the secretariat affirmed that ‘(t)he 
identification and detection of NPS form the 
basis of effective law enforcement responses 
and health interventions’ (emphasis added). 
Referring to the assembling of data as ‘this key 
issue’, the text acknowledges that unfortunately, 
‘forensic laboratory capacity in most countries 
is either lacking or not adequate to support 
the scientific evidence-based approach.’17 
Moreover, it goes on to say that: 
Four years after the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs first expressed concerns regarding the 
emergence and associated dangers of NPS 
in its resolution 55/1, entitled “Promoting 
international cooperation in responding to 
the challenges posed by new psychoactive 
substances”, NPS continue to emerge 
on the market at a fast pace, while the 
understanding of their associated health 
and social harms remains limited…
In this context, this Policy Report examines the 
proliferation of synthetic drugs on the world’s 
markets, and the growing challenge it poses 
for the international drug control regime.  As 
we shall see below, the multilateral control 
system has focused considerable attention 
on synthetic drugs at various intervals in 
the past, but the rapid expansion of ATS and 
novel forms of psychoactive substances, which 
are emerging on an unprecedented scale, 
represent a predicament unlike those that 
the regime has previously faced. It can be 
5argued that, despite a growing appreciation 
of the complexities of contemporary markets 
within parts of the UN drug control system, the 
regime remains to a large extent locked into 
an outdated and dysfunctional delineation of 
states that is configured around their status 
as either ‘producers’ or ‘consumers’ of illicit 
drugs. For over a century, this model has been 
characterised by an arcane preoccupation with 
raw narcotic plant materials (cannabis, coca 
leaf and opium poppy) that are cultivated in 
developing countries of the ‘Global South’,18 
and against which the supply side eradication 
and interdiction efforts of the North have been 
directed. This model is historically grounded, 
and reflected in the division of controlled drugs 
between the Single Convention on ‘narcotic’ 
drugs of 1961 and the synthetics-focused 
Convention on ‘Psychotropic’ Substances 
of 1971. It is perpetuated by the associated 
international drug control institutions and 
informed by the economic, cultural, political 
and security concerns of Western countries of 
the ‘Global North’.19 
In the mid-1980s, these cocaine and opioid–
focused strategies became heavily militarised 
by the US, in line with a securitisation of the 
drugs issue in that country under President 
Ronald Reagan. This, it can be argued, deepened 
the international control regime’s prioritisation 
of raw narcotics over synthetics at a time when 
the drug market structures of the post-Cold War 
era were undergoing dramatic reconfiguration. 
As the manufacture and popularity of synthetics 
grew strongly in the 1990s and 2000s, the 
drug control system was ill-prepared and ill-
equipped to address the complex and dissipated 
challenge that these types of drugs posed. 
In this regard, path dependence20 emerges as 
a key explanatory variable for the focus on 
the elimination of non-medical cultivation 
of narcotic plant materials and the relative 
neglect of synthetic drug markets. This is 
accounted for by reference to four factors: 
the historical salience of raw narcotics at the 
time of regime instauration; the ideology of 
prohibiting the use of some substances for 
anything other than medical and scientific 
purposes that informed the initiation of 
drug control; the institutionalised influence 
of European and American pharmaceutical 
lobbies (enabling a delimiting of controls 
on synthetic drugs); and the emphasis on 
overseas supply rather than domestic demand 
side reduction in the control model. This has 
legitimised persistent Western involvement 
in cultivator countries of the Global South, 
and in geo-strategically important bridge 
states that link to consumer zones in the 
North. It is argued that the opportunity 
presented by counter narcotics activity for 
Western overseas power projection is an 
important driver of ongoing regime bias, and 
an important explanation for the North’s 
difficulty in refocusing resources on synthetic 
drug consumption and domestic manufacture. 
In sum, and despite the discourse of and 
limited movement towards reorienting and 
balancing the regime, it can be argued that 
the drug control system, its actors, policies 
and institutions are locked into an historical 
modus operandi that tends to preserve the 
national interests of First World countries 
rather than responding to drug related harms 
– the avowed raison d’etre of the control 
model.  As discussed in the following section, 
such an approach is doing much to transform 
the Global North into an increasingly self-
sufficient producer region; a process that has 
significant implications for the viability of the 
traditional North / South model and strategies 
that continue to be configured around it. 
The impact of paradigm reversal – that is, of 
a neat and linear South to North cocaine and 
opioid trade becoming a much more complex 
and fragmented pattern of North to North, 
North to South and South to South flows of 
ATS and NPS – is of profound significance. 
This complexity is further elaborated by, for 
example, the production in South East Asia of 
ATS for South East Asian markets, and by the 
Global SMART analysis of flows connecting 
previously independent sub-regions. This notes:
6West Africa has become a prominent region 
for methamphetamine manufacture, which 
is then trafficked to East and South-East 
Asia. According to seizure reports, ATS, in 
particular methamphetamine, has been 
trafficked from West Africa either directly or 
via Southern Africa and Western Europe to 
East and South-East Asia and Oceania, mostly 
to Australia, Japan, Malaysia and Thailand.21
Indeed, as set out by the International Narcotic 
Control Board in 2012: 
Dividing countries into the categories of 
“drug-producing”, “drug-consuming” or 
“transit countries” has long ceased to be 
realistic. To varying degrees, all countries 
are drug-producers and drug-consumers and 
have drugs transiting through them.22  
Nevertheless, despite institutional acknowl-
edgement of the market transformations that 
are underway, the new geopolitical realities of 
the drug trade are not adequately reflected 
in enforcement activities, in the language of 
drug control institutions, or in the allocation of 
resources for research, education, treatment 
and rehabilitation. These remain in many ways 
locked on coca and opium poppy, cocaine and 
heroin, though cannabis has in recent years 
made its appearance as an object of medical 
and social intervention, and is now being fol-
lowed by synthetics.
Arguably, the synthetic drug market has been 
enabled to expand through a multi-causal lack 
of attention, while cocaine and opioid markets 
remain buoyant as a result of the extensively 
documented contradictions and counter-
productive impacts of source-focused eradication 
and interdiction strategies.23 As argued by Keefer 
and Loayza, ‘current drug policies impose large 
costs on developing countries with little evidence 
of offsetting benefits to those countries’, while 
‘interdiction and particularly crop eradication 
have little to no impact on drug use in consuming 
countries.’24 When drug control has turned its 
attention to synthetics, the tendency has been to 
apply the same generic model of criminalisation 
that has generated such perverse impacts in 
cultivating countries.  
The following section elaborates on the trends 
in contemporary drug markets introduced here, 
with a particular focus on synthetics. The 
Report then moves on to address the issue of 
path dependence and the drug control paradigm 
before exploring Post-Cold War markets and 
Western power projection as an explanation 
for the drug control system’s sclerotic and 
underwhelming performance on synthetic as 
well as naturally occurring drugs.  
    
1. CONTEMPORARY DRUG MARKET 
DYNAMICS
An ample body of literature demonstrates that 
the ideology of prohibition-oriented and often 
draconian efforts to eliminate the production, 
distribution and consumption of psychoactive 
drugs has enabled the sector to thrive.25 A review 
of UNODC World Drug Reports demonstrates 
major trend changes in the illicit drug market, 
which has grown exponentially in the post-Cold 
War era of regional integration and globalisation, 
facilitated by processes of economic, financial 
and political liberalisation discussed in Section 
3.26 These new trends include patterns of polydrug 
use, with consumers combining different types 
of stimulant, hallucinogenic and depressant 
substances; an increase in the estimated 
numbers of female drug users; rising demand for 
illicit drugs in cultivation and trafficking zones; 
and a lengthening of drug ‘careers’ among users, 
characterised by an earlier age of induction 
and continuing use after traditional markers of 
lifestyle change such as marriage, employment 
and raising a family have passed. Technology is 
also transforming the production, marketing and 
distribution of psychoactive substances, with the 
‘light net’ serving as a platform for the retailing 
of legal highs while the anonymous ‘dark net’ 
provides a forum for the purchase of these 
and illicit substances including cocaine, opium, 
heroin, MDMA, NPS and LSD.27 Indicative of the 
7growing salience of e-commerce in drug markets, 
the 2016 Global Drug Survey28 found that 18.3% 
of UK respondents, 15% of US,  10.9% of Irish and 
8.3% of Australian respondents had purchased 
drugs on the dark net in the past year.   
More people are now consuming a greater 
variety of cheaper and purer illicit drugs 
than at any point in the history of the control 
system. For academic observers, drug use 
has become a ‘global habit’29 normalised ‘by 
digital communication and the use of drug 
representations by mainstream capitalism to sell 
everyday commodities for profit […] intoxicants 
have become incorporated into everyday culture, 
and in particular youth subculture’.30 
Amphetamine Type Stimulants
Prior to entering in on this section, it is 
important to once more remind ourselves that 
the data invoked by the field of knowledge that 
deals with illicit drugs is possessed of a chronic 
contingency. The data deployed derive from 
social relationships in which it pays individuals, 
agencies, states and communities to represent 
themselves in a modified format. Drug users 
are engaging in illicit behaviour which it often 
benefits them to conceal, while enforcement 
agencies gain prestige, promotion, founds and 
other resources from identifying individuals as 
drugs offenders.  Moreover, in many instances, 
data capture frameworks do not exist; often 
the result of resource shortages.  At a deeper 
conceptual and philosophical level, there is 
no agreement as to what the basic units of 
measurement are: for example, though clearly 
an intoxicant, alcohol is not widely considered 
to be a drug. In practical terms, the inherent 
uncertainty of the present systems of data 
capture and representation are reflected in the 
often extremely wide ranges employed by the 
World Drug Report and similar publications.
That said, in terms of the types of drugs 
consumed, three important trends can be 
observed. The first is the growing supply and 
use of Amphetamine Type Stimulants (ATS) 
and Ecstasy MDMA as consumption of cocaine 
and heroin has stabilised - if not (temporarily) 
declined in some countries and regions. The 
World Drug Report 2016 cites an estimated 
figure of 35.7 million ATS users in 2014, although 
this may  be an under-estimation, since little 
data exists for much of Asia and Africa. Table 
1 below demonstrates comparative estimated 
drug use by region using available data from 
the same World Drug Report. 
Table 1: Regional Estimates of Drug Use 201431
Drug Users Africa
North 
America
Caribbean 
and South/Central 
America Europe Asia GLOBAL TOTAL
Cannabis 
Lower estimate 
Upper estimate 
Best estimate
21,030,000 
60,990,000 
47,520,000
38,520,000 
38,320,000 
48,970,000
  9,890,000
11,810,000
10,450,000
26,300,000
27,680,000
26,940,000
29,890,000
90,890,000
56,520,000
127,540,000
233,650,000
182,500,000
Opioids32 
Lower estimate 
Upper estimate
Best estimate
950,000
3,350,000
2,060,000
12,150,000
12,450,000
12,300,000
980,000
1,170,000
1,050,000
  4,590,000
  4,960,000
  4,680,000
 
9,280,000
15,830,000
12,290,000
28,570,000
38,520,000
33,120,000
Cocaine 
Lower estimate 
Upper estimate 
Best estimate
860,000
4,990,000
2,770,000
5,020,000
5,260,000
5,140,000
4,380,000
4,780,000
4,560,000
3,800,000
4,290,000
4,040,000
440,000
2,280,000
1,360,000
14,880,000
22,080,000
18,260,000
Ampheamine33
Lower estimate 
Upper estimate
Best estimate
1,440,000
9,530,000
5,540,000
4,490,000
4,620,000
4,560,000
2,830,000
3,370,000
3,040,000
2,020,000
2,800,000
2,410,000
4,300,000
35,200,000
19,750,000
15,340,000
55,900,000
35,650,000
Ecstasy  
Lower estimate 
Upper estimate  
Best estimate
370,000
2,010,000
1,160,000
2,460,000
2,520,000
2,490,000
510,000
730,000
580,000
3,270,000
3,750,000
3,500,000
2,720,000
19,380,000
11,050,000
9,890,000
29,020,000
19,400,000
8Unlike cocaine and opioids, ATS are not 
geographically confined by dependence on 
natural plant materials and can be manufactured 
from commonly available chemicals. This makes 
illicit synthetic manufacture mobile, dynamic, 
adept, and viable as either small or industrial 
scale production. With the geographical spread 
of illicit synthetic drug production, UNODC felt 
Map 1: Interregional trafficking flows of methamphetamine, 2011-201436
Map 2 : Key Locations of ATS Manufacture and Trafficking Routes37
After a few years of relative stability, the 2016 
WDR report notes that ATS seizures rose from 
144 tons in 2011 to a new peak of 173 tons 
in 2014.34: While this may reflect the shifting 
priorities of law enforcement rather than the 
growth in consumption per se, it is likely that 
estimates of expanding consumer markets are 
relatively accurate.
9Map 3: Notable locations of manufacture and main trafficking routes of ecstasy-group substances38
itself able to claim that ‘(a)ll regions with illicit 
methamphetamine markets also have illicit 
methamphetamine manufacture’.35 ( See Maps 
1-4 for details of ATS and ecstasy manufacture 
and trafficking and Box 1 for a brief overview of 
the situation in The Netherlands and the USA).
Seizure data reflects an ATS market 
dominated by methamphetamine, and one 
that almost quadrupled in East and South 
East Asia between 2009 and 2014.  The 
substance accounted for 71% of global ATS 
seizures in 2011. While methamphetamine 
pills were the predominant ATS in East and 
South-East Asia with 122.8 million pills seized 
in 2011, seizures of 8.8 tons of crystalline 
methamphetamine indicated to the UNODC 
that ‘the substance is an imminent threat.’ 
The combined total of pills and crystalline 
methamphetamine seized in 2014 rose to 108 
tons, up 21% on the previous year. Reflecting 
a complex and regionalised ATS market, 
amphetamine rather than methamphetamine 
was the most commonly used ATS in Europe, 
which alongside North America and Oceania 
also had a prevalence of Ecstasy use above 
the global average. 
Despite the geographical spread and volume 
of the ATS market, there is a paucity of data 
and qualitative information on manufacture, 
trafficking and consumption trends; a state of 
affairs that is far from new.40 This is despite 
the UNODC’s claim that:
The United Nations has been at the forefront 
of pioneering work on synthetic drugs since 
they first emerged as major substances of 
abuse in the 1960s and on a much broader 
scale, in the late 1980s and in the 1990s.41
It was not until 2008 that the UNODC 
launched dedicated ATS analysis through 
the Global SMART Programme, with the aim 
of: generating, analyzing and reporting in a 
phased manner information on the synthetic 
drug market; providing support to countries 
were the ATS market pose a particular 
challenge; and improving global responses to 
the rise in ATS manufacture, trafficking and 
consumption. East Asia was the first focus 
priority region, extending to Latin America in 
2011. The programme’s first report on NPS was 
published in 2013.42 The CND 2016 conference 
paper on NPS noted that ‘(i)n response to 
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the increased NPS threat, UNODC began 
to gradually incorporate NPS in its global 
synthetics monitoring analysis reporting and 
trends (Global SMART) programme’.43
The value of SMART reports in ‘improving the 
ability of states to respond to the growing 
human security and public health threats 
posed by the illicit manufacture, trafficking 
and use of synthetic drugs’44 is questionable. 
According to the regional assessment Report 
for East and Southeast Asia, 2013:
…numerous challenges remain in assessing 
the full extent of the security and health 
implications of the illicit manufacture, 
trafficking and use of ATS and other 
synthetic drugs in the region. 
The 2011 SMART Preliminary Assessment report 
for Latin America noted:
 
…although still low, especially when compared 
to other regions of the world like Asia, use 
of amphetamine-type stimulants seems to 
be increasing in Latin America. This increase, 
coupled with the scarcity of data on ATS, the 
limited knowledge about the composition and 
effects of these drugs and the relative sim-
plicity of manufacturing methods can increase 
the risks of ATS trafficking in Latin America.45
In persistently highlighting a lack of reliable 
and detailed data, the SMART reports echo the 
literature review conducted by Degenhardt 
et al (2010),46 who in their analysis of the 
policy and public health implications of 
ATS, principally methamphetamine and 
amphetamine, found that: 
There are understandable concerns over 
potential harms including the transmission 
of HIV. However, there have been no previous 
global reviews of the extent to which these 
drugs are injected or levels of HIV among users 
[…] few countries document HIV prevalence/
incidence among M/A injectors. High risk 
sexual behaviour among M/A users may 
contribute to increased risk of HIV infection, 
but available evidence is not sufficient to 
determine if the association is causal.
On Latin America, Degenhardt et al at the 
Reference Group to the United Nations on HIV 
and injecting drug use found a ‘lack of data on 
M/A use and injection’ while for Australasia 
and the Pacific ‘there was limited or no data 
on meth/amphetamine use.’ Ability to assess a 
range of countries including Albania, Andorra, 
Monaco, Montenegro, Liechtenstein and 
Macedonia was impaired by ‘Limited or no data’, 
similarly for Sub Saharan Africa: ‘Data are 
notably absent here.’ Middle East, North Africa, 
Map 4 : Reporting on ATS Manufacture39
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Europe and North American also presented gaps 
in information and analysis and in most cases 
use of ATS was thought to be ‘underestimated.’ 
Since the research of Degenhardt et al, there 
has been some progress. While it acknowledges 
that evidence remains limited, the SMART 
Programme reported on the injecting of both 
ATS and NPS in its Global Update of March 
2016. The update ‘demonstrates that injecting 
use of synthetic drugs with stimulant effects 
exists in many parts of the world’.  It observes 
that injecting and sexual risk behaviours 
of people who inject synthetic drugs ‘may 
expose already vulnerable injecting drug users 
to additional health risks’, including that of 
contracting and transmitting HIV and other 
blood-borne- viruses, and concludes that ‘It 
is therefore important that policy responses 
take this vulnerability into consideration when 
designing programmes and services to support 
and protect people who inject drugs’.  
The absence of reliable data sets and 
longitudinal information is of serious concern. 
It underscores the weakness of early warning 
systems and scenario analysis in drug control 
institutions. In the vacuum of information there 
is a tendency toward anecdotal information. 
A review of the SMART reports shows lack of 
supporting evidence for a number of assertions 
made and little to no follow up of claims that 
would enable a more comprehensive picture 
of ATS markets to be developed. For example, 
a number of countries reporting to ‘Patterns 
and Trends of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants 
and Other Drugs: Challenges for Asia and the 
Pacific’ assert that Cameroon, Nigeria and 
‘West Africa’ are principal ATS embarkation 
points, and nationals from these countries 
in addition to Iran are key ATS traffickers. 
However it proved impossible to trace back 
these claims in order to understand apparent 
patterns of West to East ATS trafficking, to 
determine the manufacturing location of ATS 
distributed from West Africa, or comprehend 
the role of Iran in the illicit ATS trade. It can 
be argued that as official documents, the 
SMART reports bring little additional value 
to the development of evidence based drug 
policies and they in some ways compound 
rather than validate speculative assessment, 
for example, in relation to West Africa’s role 
in the international drug trade.47 
The relative lack of research and attention 
to synthetic markets has in turn contributed 
to a severe underfunding of treatment 
programmes. According to one study of ATS 
use in the US ‘the attendant problems related 
to dependent use have placed a strain on 
services’.48 In relation to the Asia and Pacific 
region, the 2013 Global SMART report49 sets 
out that the number of methamphetamine 
users receiving treatment in Singapore 
increased to the highest level reported over 
the past five years (42% of all persons receiving 
drug treatment in 2012), while in Cambodia, 
methamphetamine users accounted for 89% 
of all persons receiving treatment, rising to 
97% in Brunei Darussalam.50 Methamphetamine 
pills were the most common drug of misuse 
(82%) among persons receiving treatment in 
Thailand and Lao PDR (51%). However, despite 
evident demand and as set out by the UNODC 
in the ‘Regional Programme for Southeast Asia 
2014 – 2017’51 ‘most drug treatment services 
in the region continue to be aimed at heroin, 
opium and cannabis users. Moreover, in several 
countries in the region, a large number of 
persons receiving drug treatment are arrested 
drug users sent to compulsory drug treatment 
facilities, most of which do not provide ATS-
specific drug treatment services.’
Just as resourcing for ATS-related health care 
services has lagged changing patterns of misuse 
and treatment demand, funding for research 
on synthetic drugs has been traditionally low 
in comparison to the resources dedicated to 
assessment of cocaine and heroin markets. 
This is the case not only in relation to 
epidemiological surveys, but also scientific 
analysis, which has fallen behind innovation in 
the illicit synthetic sector.  Further discussion 
follows in the section dealing with NPS.  
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Box 1:  The Netherlands, United States and the production of synthetics
According to the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (ECMDDA), the 
north-western region of Europe is of global significance as a producer of synthetic drugs. It is 
conducted by organised crime groups based in Belgium and, especially, the Netherlands. The 
Netherlands is believed to be the major producer of MDMA deriving from Europe, and is also the 
source of methamphetamine, though as a global supplier its importance has reduced in recent 
years owing to a proliferation of sites of production. The manufacture of amphetamine is also 
less than was previously the case.52
According to the President’s Office of National Drug Control Policy, NPS are ‘manufactured 
in labs overseas’ and ‘marketed in the United States and sold over the internet’.53  However, 
the Global SMART Programme reports a number of major arrests for production of fentanyl 
analogues in Los Angeles and New York.  It is possible that the production of NPS is expanding 
in the US.54 
Meanwhile, methamphetamine has a history of production in the US. When consumption peaked 
in the 1990s, it was fuelled largely by domestic product, manufactured both on small scale 
operations using ephedrine and pseudoephedrine extracted from cold medications, and in ‘super-
labs’ employing imported precursors. Many of these large-scale labs have relocated to Mexico.55 
New Psychoactive Substances
A second significant change in contemporary 
drug markets is the rise of New Psychoactive 
Substances (NPS), sometimes known as 
‘legal highs’. These are chemical analogues 
- structural derivatives that differ from the 
original by miniscule chemical modification 
or mimetics that are chemically different 
from controlled substances but which mimic 
the pharmacological effects of a prohibited 
substance such as cannabis. 
These chemicals are not new per se; instead, the 
word is used to denote their novelty as products 
for human consumption and their appearance 
on non-medical or recreational drug markets. 
According to UNODC, between 2012 and 2014, 
most NPS reported for the first time belonged to 
the group of synthetic cannabinoids. The World 
Drug Report 2016, however, has identified a 
different trend in the data for 2015, which at the 
time of writing is still under collection.  Firstly, 
75 new substances have been reported to UNODC 
in 2015, compared with 66 in 2014, despite the 
fact that data collection is unfinished. Of these 
substances, 20 represent synthetic cathinones 
(stimulant drugs resembling ATS and cocaine), a 
figure close to the 21 new synthetic cannabinoids 
and 21 ‘other’ substances. The latter refers to 
intoxicants that do not readily fit into the major 
NPS categories, and included synthetic opioids 
such as fentanyl derivatives. Fentanyl represents 
a case of chemical innovation being carried out 
by underground chemists; according to the DEA, 
the ‘current fentanyl crisis in the USA is largely 
fuelled by illicitly manufactured fentanyl and its 
analogues, which are either illegally imported as 
such or synthesised from imported precursors’.56 
Synthetic cannabinoids first appeared in the 
mid-2000s; ketamine, phenethylamines and 
piperazines generally emerged prior to 2008, 
while synthetic cathinone-type substances 
such as mephedrone, which is marketed as 
an alternative to cocaine, began to dominate 
markets along with cannabinoids in 2009 and 
2010. 40% of reporting countries mentioned 
plant-based NPS such as Salvia divinorum, 
Kratom and Khat.57 The inclusion of these plant-
based psychoactives in the category of NPS is 
confusing given they are naturally occurring 
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and have an extensive history of use. However, 
as noted above, it is their emergence on 
contemporary drug markets that leads to their 
classification as NPS. 
The preface to the 2013 World Drug Report 
states that: 
The multitude of new psychoactive 
substances and the speed with which they 
have emerged in all regions of the world 
is one of the most notable trends in drug 
markets over the past five years. 
Similarly, the INCB stated in its 2015 Annual 
Report:
In recent years, there have been…challenges 
such as the appearance of new psychoactive 
substances. Governments acknowledge the 
complexity of dealing with an ever-changing 
spectrum of substances made especially to 
circumvent controls.58
As discussed below, the popularity of NPS 
is contested. Nevertheless, the major 
significance of this type of psychoactive 
is, as the INCB acknowledges, the challenge 
posed to the control system by the sector’s 
capacity for innovation. It is recognised that 
minor modification to chemical structure 
will enable NPS manufacturers to circumvent 
moves toward inclusion in the control regime. 
Further to this, the dual use of many of 
these substances, for example, ketamine in 
anaesthetic surgery, makes articulation of an 
effective control regime a complex task.59 
Faced with the prospect of an ever evolving 
NPS market (See Box 2), some authorities 
have made the decision to engage with 
the displacement effect of prohibition-
based strategies via alternative regulatory 
approaches. This is exemplified by discussion 
of NPS controls in New Zealand, which looked 
to proven harm as the determinant of legality. 
This principle was accepted in the country’s 
2013 Psychoactive Substances Act. The 
legislation planned to regulate the sale, 
manufacture, and importation of NPS. After 
numerous attempts to simply ban NPS, only to 
see them rapidly replaced by new substances, 
the New Zealand government decided to take a 
different approach. The Act turned the tables, 
placing the burden of proof onto manufacturers 
to prove the substances were ‘low risk’ before 
they could be legally sold. To avoid recourse 
to underground markets, some 47 substances 
were granted interim licence exemptions. The 
Act provided the government with the power 
to instantly remove products from sale should 
they prove to be causing harm. The decision to 
revoke licenses was to be based on evidence 
provided by the National Poisons Centre and 
Centre for Adverse Reactions Monitoring 
(CARM). In the first nine months of the Act, five 
products had their interim licenses revoked for 
these reasons.60
However, in April 2014, the government 
announced plans to change the Psychoactive 
Substances Act to revoke all interim product 
approvals, and in May passed the Psychoactive 
Substances Amendment Act. This move 
appears to have been driven by mass media 
discourses rather than the evidential grounds 
that were supposed to underpin the new 
policy. Furthermore, a moratorium was placed 
on application for exempted substances 
prior to proof of their lack of harm.  Such a 
requirement is essentially self-defeating, since 
it would require unethical experimentation to 
demonstrate, and thereby ‘prove’.61 The use of 
animal testing would be a key ingredient of such 
a process, yet animal-testing was forbidden by 
the same amendment that banned temporary 
exemptions. Since these events, no licences 
have been granted – indeed, no applications 
for retail licences have even been made.62 
Instead, an unregulated market continues to 
supply the products to consumers.
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Box 2: Mephedrone in the UK: Pre- and post-control
Mephedrone was scheduled under UK law in April 2010, and became a Class B controlled drug. 
The UK also led moves at the CND in Vienna to provisionally schedule the substance under the 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances, 1971, a move that was passed successfully at the CND 
in 2015. 63 
The UK’s argument in favour of provisional scheduling was based largely on the alleged success 
its domestic controls. Its background document prepared for CND stated that: 
‘There is evidence that controlling mephedrone under the Misuse of Drugs Act has been 
effective at reducing use. Reported use of mephedrone in 2012/13 had fallen by around two 
thirds compared to 2010/11’.64 
On the surface, this appears to represent a successful result for the legislation. However, the 
causal linkage claimed by the UK government has been disputed by several academics and 
civil society groups. A year after UK domestic controls were placed on mephedrone, a group 
of academics carried out research in two south London ‘gay friendly’ dance clubs.65  These 
clubs had been studied previously, and the object was to assess the prevalence of mephedrone 
before and after the substance was controlled, using research instruments completed by 315 
customers. It was found that mephedrone remained the most popular of the drugs used, and 
prevalence had even increased from 27 per cent to 41 per cent of those surveyed across the 
year between 2010 and 2011. The authors commented that, ‘Club-goers appeared undeterred 
by the legal classification of this emergent psychoactive substance.’ It was amongst clubbers 
that use of mephedrone remained relatively high, while other sectors of the population 
apparently moved away from the drug. Where, however, did they move to?
Some put the drop in prevalence down to a new, organised crime-controlled market that 
moved into the vacuum created by the legislation; on a growth in the quantity and purity of 
ecstasy and a shift to cocaine.66   The most popular period for mephedrone coincided with 
a drought on the MDMA (ecstasy) scene.67  Moreover, a raft of alternative NPS products has 
appeared on the market, repeating a historical lesson that most regulators have, it seems, yet 
to learn: when a drug is banned, its consumers tend to replace, not with abstinence, but with 
alternative drugs or formulations of the same drug.
As with the research and empirical data on 
ATS manufacture, trafficking and use, there is 
no comprehensive picture of NPS markets or 
production zones. This is despite the risk to 
public health set out in the preface to the 2013 
World Drug Report: ‘The increasing number of 
NPS appearing on the market has also become a 
major public health concern, not only because 
of increasing use but also because of the lack of 
scientific research and understanding of their 
adverse effects.’
Documentation from the 2016 CND cites 
various regions and countries as sources of NPS 
manufacture: China and India are perceived 
as major manufactures, while Europe is often 
viewed as a trans-shipment hub. ‘However,’ 
the report continues, a number of European 
countries, such as the ‘Czech Republic, Hungary, 
the Netherlands, Portugal Spain Ukraine and 
the United Kingdom have also been identified 
as potential sources of NPS’.68  It is unclear 
whether related activities such as refining, 
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tabletting, cutting, packaging the so on are 
also carried on in Europe. In contrast to illicit 
synthetics, NPS trafficking deviates from 
the clandestine manufacture of controlled 
psychotropic substances such as ATS, which 
typically occurs within the same region as 
where consumers are located. This is linked 
to the role of the Internet, which serves as a 
source of supply according to 88% of countries 
responding to the UNODC survey.69
 
National governments have only recently 
begun to incorporate NPS into drug monitoring 
surveys. The information to date would appear 
to demonstrate the strengthening of market 
demand among younger generations of drug 
users, as well as national and regional variety of 
NPS preference. As discussed in the Introduction, 
and demonstrated in Table 2 below, Europe is 
a vibrant NPS market, although with distinct 
variations in use levels reflected in the contrast 
between reporting rates of 18-24 year olds in 
Cyprus (where 100% of respondents said they 
had never taken NPS), Malta and Finland at 
one end of the scale, and Ireland, Spain and 
Slovenia at the other. 70
Australia first began monitoring NPS use in the 
2010 ‘Drug Trends in Ecstasy and Related Drug 
Markets’ (EDRS) report based on surveys with 
Ecstasy users. The 2011 report found ketamine 
to be the most commonly used NPS, followed 
by mephedrone and Dimethyltryptamine 
(DMT).72 In the 2015 report, the most 
Table 2: Young People and NPS71
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018 (reported by 50), mephedrone (reported by 
49) and methylone (reported by 47).80 
Bearing in mind the potential health impact of 
these largely unknown substances, the Global 
SMART Programme comments in a 2016 Report: 
Given the diversity of NPS on the global drug 
market and in order to provide appropriate 
legal responses, the 2014 UNODC-WHO 
Expert Consultation on NPS recognized the 
need to prioritize for international control, 
the most harmful, prevalent and persistent 
NPS. In 2015, nine NPS were prioritized 
for review by the WHO ECDD at its 37th 
Meeting in November 2015. This process 
has ultimately led to the scheduling of 
seven substances during the 59th session 
of the CND, held on 16 to 22 March 2016.81
However, the data on NPS and the extent to 
which these substances represent a significant 
health threat is contested. The official 
surveys discussed above rely on small samples 
and have tended to focus on younger age 
cohorts, whose behaviours cannot be reliably 
extrapolated or different control schedules 
verified. By contrast, the 2014 Global Drugs 
Survey of 7 countries based on 80,000 self-
selecting respondents highlights the ongoing 
predominance of cannabis, ATS and cocaine 
alongside the most popular psychoactives 
alcohol, tobacco and caffeine energy drinks, 
with low level reporting of NPS consumption. 
commonly used NPS were DMT, 
(a hallucinogenic tryptamine), 
NBOMe (a psychedelic drug 
with stimulant effects) and 
2C-B (another psychedelic 
stimulant).73 By contrast in 
New Zealand, the Ministry of 
Health’s most recent (2007/08) 
national drug use survey74 found 
BZP to be the most popular NSP, 
outstripping use of illicit drugs 
including amphetamines and 
cocaine (see table 3).
The US ‘Monitoring the Future’ survey 
questioned use of synthetic cannabis for the first 
time in its 2011 report. It found this to be the 
second most popular substance after cannabis 
among High School students, with 11.4% of 12th 
graders reporting use of synthetic cannabinoids 
in the previous 12 months. At a prevalence rate 
of 5.9% for salvia divinorum, NPS emerged as 
more popular than cocaine (2.9%) and heroin 
(0.8%).76 The 2016 Monitoring the Future Report 
had the figure for 12th graders using synthetic 
cannabis down to 3.5% in the past year, and 
the equivalent for Salvia fallen to 1.8%. 77 The 
trend of new generations of drug users moving 
away from illicit drugs such as cocaine and 
heroin to NPS  was echoed in Canada, where 
the 2010-2011 ‘Youth Smoking Survey’ showed 
salvia divinorum (3.4%), ketamine (1.6%) and 
‘other drugs’ (9.7%) to had a higher prevalence 
rate than cocaine (2.3%) and heroin (1.1%).78 
Amongst Canadian youth from 15-24, this trend 
has in some respects continued, with Salvia 
and hallucinogens at 2.7%, above cocaine and 
crack at 2.4%.79
The 2016 World Drug Report reports that the 
majority of countries and territories indicating 
the emergence of NPS up to December 2015 
were from Europe (41), Asia (30), Africa (16), 
the Americas (13) and Oceania (2). The numbers 
of NPS reported grow each year, and some have 
obtained an established place in illicit markets: 
the include ketamine (reported by 62 countries 
and territories), khat (reported by 56), JWH-
Table 3: Prevalence of drug and NPS use in New Zealand adults 75
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In Australia for example, of 5,943 respondents 
in the Global Drugs Survey, 34.7% reported 
cannabis, 23% MDMA and 20.6% cocaine, with 
only 4.1% reporting ketamine use. This figure 
was below use of magic mushrooms, LSD and 
nitrous oxide and generates a different picture 
of consumer preferences than conveyed in 
the ‘Drug Trends in Ecstasy and Related Drug 
Markets’ report. In European countries, the US 
and South America, the Global Drugs Survey 
also found MDMA, LSD, cannabis, cocaine and 
ATS to be the preferred psychoactives (after 
alcohol, tobacco and energy drinks), with 
low level NPS prevalence dissipated across a 
fluctuating range of different substances.82
Cannabis Cultivation
Although consumer diversification from 
‘natural’, plant based drugs such as opioids and 
cocaine to ATS, MDMA and NPS demonstrates 
a transformation of global drug markets, 
high levels of cannabis use has remained a 
constant. That said, changes in patterns of 
cannabis production also highlight the dynamic 
nature of contemporary drug markets and 
the blurring distinctions between traditional 
‘producer’ and ‘consumer’ states. And for 
these reasons some discussion of the cannabis 
market is necessary. Cannabis continues to be 
the most widely consumed illicit drug in the 
world, with an estimated 180.6 million users – 
equating to 3.9% of the global population. As 
demonstrated in Table 1, there is consistency 
in the popularity of cannabis across all 
geographical regions of the world according 
to UNODC figures. This is echoed in the 2014 
Global Drug Survey, which found cannabis to be 
the most commonly consumed illicit substance 
in previous 12 month use, consistently located 
within the top 4 of all psychoactives alongside 
alcohol, tobacco and caffeine energy drinks. 
The exception was the Netherlands, where 
MDMA use was more prevalent than cannabis.83 
Cannabis retained its popularity in the 2016 
iteration of the Survey as the most popular 
drug, with 63.14% of respondents having used 
it in the past year.84
The significance of the sustained popularity 
of cannabis to this report relates to changes 
in cultivation and supply. According to the 
2013 World Drug Report: ‘Providing a global 
picture of levels of cannabis cultivation and 
production remains a difficult task’, this is 
because ‘cannabis is produced in practically 
every country in the world.’85 The 2016 World 
Drug Report shows that cannabis cultivation 
was reported in 129 territories between 2009 
and 2014. It recognises, however, that ‘the 
extent and trends in cannabis cultivation and 
production are difficult to assess’. 86
In this regard, the UK is a case in point.  A 
decade ago, a report by the UK based Joseph 
Rowntree Trust set out that: 
Traditionally cannabis has been imported 
into the country [the UK] by drug traffickers, 
but rapid changes are occurring. There is 
no precise information on the extent of 
home cultivation, but it is clear that it has 
increased steeply over the past decade.87 
In 2012, the Association of Chief Police 
Officers reported that 7,800 cannabis factories 
had been detected in England and Wales in 
2011 more than double the figure of 3,000 
recorded in 2008, with 1.1 million cannabis 
plants seized. This trend of rising domestic 
cultivation in a traditional consumer country 
of the Global North finds echo across Western 
Europe and North America. In the US, a 
reported 10.3 million cannabis plants were 
destroyed in 2010,88 with an estimated 95.5% 
of cultivation occurring on outdoor growing 
sites, in particular national parks and tribal 
areas. If eradication is read as an indicator of 
supply levels, then Table 4 below demonstrates 
escalating cannabis cultivation and eradication 
in the US during the 2015.
Cannabis cultivation in the Global North 
has sharply reduced reliance on traditional 
suppliers in the Global South such as Morocco, 
India, Lebanon, Mexico and Colombia and it 
can be accounted for by a number of factors, 
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the most significant being the availability of 
hydroponic growing kits, cannabis seeds and 
instruction manuals, and ‘successful’ border 
interdiction of imported cannabis herb and resin. 
This served to catalyse domestic cultivation 
of cannabis herb to substitute for reductions 
in external supply. The EMCDDA reports that 
during the 1980s the Netherlands became a hub 
of cannabis knowledge, which was gradually 
exported to other European countries. The 
spread of this ‘know-how’, combined with 
technological developments, led to ‘a trend in 
several European countries (mostly Western) 
towards “import substitution”’, involving 
domestic production of cannabis to supply 
domestic demand, ‘and reducing reliance on 
imported products’.90 These changes have led 
to shifts in consumption, with herbal cannabis 
overtaking resin as the leading form of the 
drug in Europe overall.
Table 4: Cannabis Eradication by state, USA 201589 
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Similar trends were seen in the US cannabis 
markets in the 1970s, when aerial fumigation 
of Mexican cannabis fields re-stimulated 
cultivation in the US. The impact of this import 
substitute industrialisation process in cannabis 
markets has been to bring supply chains closer 
to Western consumer markets; to increase 
the strength of domestic cannabis through 
hydroponic growing of genetically modified 
strains, and to stimulate small scale cultivation 
operating within localised distribution networks. 
Despite these important changes to the structure, 
organisation and geography of the cannabis 
market, the attention of the UN drug control 
system has remained fixed predominantly on 
‘traditional’ suppliers of cannabis resin and herb 
from the Global South. Successive World Drug 
Reports provide detailed statistics quantifying 
cultivation and production in Morocco, 
Afghanistan and Lebanon as demonstrated in 
Table 5 below.91 By contrast, there is little to 
no parallel, detailed information provided for 
major First World producers such as the USA, 
Canada or the Netherlands. None of these 
Western countries are used as case studies in 
the World Drug Report and there is no equivalent 
elaboration of the role of these countries in the 
global drug trade as that applied to countries 
of the Global South. Part of this is certainly the 
result of the difficulty of measuring synthetic 
production, as discussed above.
Developments in the cannabis markets reflect 
a re-ordering of drug production geographies 
from South to North, which is reinforced 
by the rise of ATS and NPS manufacture. 
It is tempting to argue that there is an 
ongoing lack of scrutiny of the West’s role 
in the international drug trade, and an 
evident reluctance to substitute the US and 
Netherlands for Colombia and Afghanistan 
in the language of ‘leading drug producers’. 
However, rather than understanding the 
global North as occupying the role previously 
assigned to the South – as the site of the 
world’s drug production – a more radical 
conception involves questioning the ongoing 
relevance of these terms. With production, 
distribution, consumption no longer being 
locked into discrete geographical or regional 
zones, the shifts in the political economies 
of drugs forces us to think in new ways, 
beyond the old binary classifications and 
their associated policies.  Within the UN’s 
language of ‘shared responsibility’,93 changes 
in perception are taking place. There remains, 
however, much work to be done. 
In understanding this ‘denial’ of the West’s 
role, Francisco Thoumi94 sets out that during 
his co-ordination of the 2000 World Drug 
Report, the then Executive Director of the UN 
Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
(the forerunner of the UNODC) Pino Arlacchi:   
Table 5: Main Source of Cannabis Resin - data collected from Annual Report Questionnaires92
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…frequently argued that the world drug 
problem was on the verge of being solved and 
that there were only three countries that 
were real problems: Colombia, Afghanistan 
and Myanmar […] He then decided to 
change the WDR outline eliminating several 
chapters and sections […] The main chapters 
and sections eliminated were: a substantial 
chapter on synthetic drugs, a large section on 
marijuana, a section on links between drugs 
and international organised crime […] The 
elimination of the synthetic drugs chapter 
dropped from the report the fastest growing 
illicit drugs, a large proportion of which are 
produced in developed countries. Marijuana, 
a large cash crop in several American States 
also disappeared. The chapter linking illicit 
drugs with international organized crime 
would have focused the readers’ attention 
on transit and mainly consuming countries.
Thoumi links this bias to the funding structure 
of international drug control institutions, 
which is based on donor country contributions 
and not UN general funds:
Those donors can control the use of their funds 
and can influence ODCCP policy through them 
[…] One issue derived from this dependency 
is to what extent ODCCP’s funding problems 
makes it easy for particular countries like the 
United States to promote its own drug policies 
through the United Nations.95 
Arising from this assertion is a need to understand 
the motivations and interests that the Global 
North has in retaining traditional strategies, 
narratives and institutional concerns. Synthetic 
drugs pose a qualitatively different challenge to 
that presented by cocaine and opioids. As such, the 
synthetic revolution provides an opportunity for a 
recasting and redesign of drug control policy and 
institutions in a manner that enables rectification 
of misdirected funding and enforcement efforts. 
However, for reasons discussed in the following 
sections, it is questionable whether the current 
regime can refocus away from the historic 
preoccupation with cocaine and opioids.    
2: PATH DEPENDENCE AND THE DRUG 
CONTROL PARADIGM
A key explanation for the prioritisation of raw 
narcotic plant materials within international 
drug control is the historical context of the 
system’s foundation, and the subsequent 
reinforcement of principles and guiding 
assumptions in the succession of inter- and 
post-war international conventions. 
The Inter War Regime
The initiation of narco-diplomacy by the United 
States government at the turn of the twentieth 
century was catalysed by preoccupation 
with the ‘opium question’. This was in part 
expressed as concern at the public health 
impacts of opioid use set against the backdrop 
of the commercialisation and massification of 
opium, morphine and heroin in the nineteenth 
century, and growing understanding of the 
perils of overdose and dependency.96 Gary 
Henderson outlines the advances in chemistry 
that explain the shift toward repression of 
a 3,400-year history of opium consumption, 
which can in turn be read as an explanation of 
the control system’s evolution: 
Until the nineteenth century, drugs came 
from unrefined plants and animal products 
[…] Eating crude plant material offered 
a certain safety margin since biologically 
active components are usually present 
in small amounts and overdosing was 
physically difficult […] a major trend 
throughout the history of drug use and 
abuse is the increased hazards associated 
with the use of more potent drugs, either 
purified plant materials or new synthetic 
compounds. Drugs became more potent 
as chemists were able to extract and 
purify the active ingredients present in 
botanicals.… The abuse of these purified, 
more potent materials soon followed.97
The US reinforced its diplomatic initiative to 
convene an international meeting to agree 
controls on the opium trade with a moral 
agenda expressed in the evangelical language 
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of the prohibition movement and which 
tapped the outrage of European Christian 
and Quaker groups at the dependence of 
Empire (in particular the British) on opium 
revenues. Economic, political and cultural 
considerations also explain US hostility to 
the opium trade. The country controlled no 
overseas poppy cultivation territory and was 
largely excluded from the lucrative opium 
market, with the British banning American 
traders from opium auctions in Calcutta, India. 
Pressing for restrictions on opium cultivation, 
exports and use had no financial implications 
for the US, while a position antithetical to the 
trade opened up commercial and diplomatic 
relations with China, which had itself long 
(and unsuccessfully) contested the allegedly98 
ruinous impacts of opium imported from India 
by British merchants.  
For these historical reasons, opioids were the 
central preoccupation of the nascent control 
system, exemplified by the 1912 Hague Opium 
Convention and resulting inter-war treaties 
that were administered by the League of 
Nations. These included the 1925 Agreement 
Concerning the Manufacture of, Internal 
Trade in, and Use of Prepared Opium, the 1928 
International Opium Convention and 1937 
Agreement for the Control of Opium Smoking 
in the Far East. According to the drug policy 
analyst Martin Jelsma the inter-war period 
was one of significant success in curtailing 
the free trade in opium. This he attributes to 
the regulatory framework of the early treaty 
regime, which contrasts with the prohibition 
orientation of the post-war framework: 
The first 1912 Hague Opium Convention 
and the treaties negotiated subsequently 
in the League of Nations era […] aimed to 
control the excesses of an unregulated free 
trade regime, substantially regarding opium. 
Restrictions were imposed on exports to 
those countries in which national laws had 
been introduced against nonmedical use of 
opiates, but there were no treaty obligations 
to declare drug use or cultivation illicit, let 
alone to apply criminal sanctions. The early 
series of conventions in effect established 
administrative import and export regulations 
for opiates, cocaine and, from 1925, cannabis, 
without criminalising the substances, users 
or growers of the raw materials.99
This point of view is arguable, since criminal 
sanctions were applied in many of the countries 
who ratified these treaties. 
Historians note US frustration with the 
compromises forced by European powers who 
favoured a more gradualist approach. The US 
preference for criminalisation of non-medical 
cultivation and consumption of opium, as well 
as coca leaf and cannabis was, in many cases, 
rejected as unenforceable and unwarranted. 
Sharing the European position were cultivator 
states such as Persia, Turkey, India and Peru, 
the latter having framed its 1898 national 
development strategy around expansion 
of international cocaine markets. These 
countries: ‘considered domestic drug use as 
an internal matter, not subject to interference 
from states’100 and rejected the searing 
economic impact implied by eradication of 
non-medical cultivation. 
Importantly, the European pharmaceutical 
lobby was another obstacle to US ambitions 
to install a prohibition oriented regime. US 
concerns at the diversion of pharmaceutical 
stocks of morphine, cocaine101 and derivative 
drugs such as codeine to illicit markets was 
deflected by pharmaceutical interests. As 
outlined by the historian William McAllister: 
Germany, Switzerland, the Netherlands and 
other states possessing significant pharma-
ceutical industries might support controls 
over raw materials, but they objected to 
limitations on manufactured drugs.102 
Amid European concerns over access to 
and pricing of medical stocks, restrictions 
on research and development, and loss of 
comparative advantage, US proposals for 
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a cartel of pharmaceutical opioid supply 
and a strict regime for reporting imports 
of manufactured drugs was resisted. The 
resulting 1931 Convention for Limiting the 
Manufacture and Regulating the Distribution 
of Narcotic Drugs required countries to submit 
estimates for manufactured drugs to the newly 
created Drug Supervisory Body (DSB). However 
the authority of the DSB was circumscribed 
and this impeded the body’s efforts to match 
cultivation and manufacturing levels to 
international pharmaceutical demand. 
More significantly, the 1931 Convention 
established two schedules of drugs. The 
first group were subject to strict regulation 
and included all preparations made from 
raw opium and containing 20% or more of 
morphine, morphine and its salts including 
heroin; preparations made from the coca leaf 
including cocaine and its salts; and codeine 
and morphine derivatives.103 There was greater 
flexibility in adjusting national reporting 
requirements in relation to the second group, 
which included methylmorphine (codeine), 
ethylmorphine and their salts.104 Reflecting on 
the implications of the schedules of control, 
McAllister sets out that:   
From 1931 on, the notion that abuse 
potential might follow from graduated 
levels of control became an important 
feature of the international regime 
[…] the potential disparity encouraged 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to seek 
a type of comparative international 
regulatory advantage: a company could gain 
market share if its drug were exempted from 
controls imposed on competing products. 
Restricted to the licit drug market after 
1931, this tiered regulation system […] 
encouraged pharmaceutical manufacturers 
to insinuate themselves into the process of 
implementing and modifying the regime.105
  
What might be regarded as the foundational 
period of the regime thus embedded raw plant 
narcotics and cultivating regions of the Global 
South at the centre of a supply side focused 
regulatory system. By contrast, European 
pharmaceutical interests were effective 
in delimiting controls over research and 
manufacture of derivative and synthetic drugs. 
The Post War System: From Regulation to a 
Prohibition-oriented approach 
The conventions introduced after the Second 
World War were framed by the US prohibition-
oriented position and US priorities, with 
the objections of European gradualists 
and cultivating country opponents pushed 
aside.106 Factors accounting for the ability of 
the US to forge the post-War control regime 
include the geostrategic power shift from a 
devastated Europe to the US, whose economy 
had prospered from its role as the ‘arsenal of 
democracy’; the defeat of Japan and Germany 
(two significant Convention violators); the role 
of the US in liberating opium cultivating and 
consuming countries in South East Asia; and US 
influence over the drug control bodies of the 
League of Nations, such as the Opium Advisory 
Committee, which relocated to the US during 
the Second World War.107   
The expansion in synthetic drugs (e.g. 
methadone, pethidine) that occurred in 
wartime conditions led to an enhanced 
concern with their control following the defeat 
of the axis powers in 1945. Indeed, the first 
serious development under United Nations 
international drug control law and policy was 
focused on the issue of synthetics: the Paris 
Protocol of 1948.108 Under the terms of the 
previous international legal instruments of the 
foundational period, there was no satisfactory 
means of placing the new synthetics under 
control. The 1931convention included 
measures to regulate new drugs, but under the 
relevant article 11, only those deriving from 
the phenanthrene alkaloids of opium and the 
ecgonine alkaloids of cocaine were applicable. 
Article 10 of the 1925 convention, meanwhile, 
could potentially have been employed to 
control new synthetic drugs, but did not apply 
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direct control over manufacture or trade. In 
addition, article 10 was binding only on those 
States which agreed to be governed by its 
recommendations and provisions.109  According 
to Neil Boister, in a theme that prefigured 
contemporary anxieties: 
It was feared that modern chemistry could 
allow the abandonment of organic drugs 
by illicit traffickers as it became possible 
to produce equally marketable substances 
in laboratories located much closer to the 
markets in developed countries.110 
The then only recently formed CND requested 
the secretariat to explore solutions to this 
dilemma. Control could be achieved by 
amending existing conventions, or by forging 
a new international agreement. In view of the 
great difficulties involved in changing multi-
national treaties the secretariat recommended 
the latter option and the Paris Protocol came 
into force on the 1st December 1949.111 This 
instrument permitted the World Health 
Organization, itself only coming into being in 
1948, to make binding recommendations on 
countries; as Boister observes:
In terms of the Protocol WHO experts were 
given the power to make binding decisions 
as to whether a substance was addictive 
or capable of being converted into an 
addictive substance, and to authorise, 
without the consent of the parties, the 
placing of new synthetic drugs under the 
same control regime as applied to the 
organically based drugs under the pre-war 
conventions. The Protocol was a success 
with all the principal drug manufacturing 
states becoming party to it and many non-
parties applying its provisions.112
Over thirty drugs were scheduled by the Paris 
Protocol by the early 1950s, more than the 
numbers controlled by all the previous legal 
international instruments together at that 
time.113
Shortly afterwards, though, a new, more 
rigorously ideological approach was 
exemplified by the 1961 Single Convention on 
Narcotic Drugs,114 the preamble to which set out 
that: ‘addiction to narcotic drugs constitutes a 
serious evil for the individual and is fraught 
with social and economic danger to mankind.’ 
States were called on to assume their ‘duty to 
prevent and combat this evil’. The Convention 
established a goal of eliminating non-medical 
cultivation and production of opium within 
a 15-year period, and coca leaf and – for the 
first time - cannabis cultivation within 25 
years. Articles 22 and 26 obliged states to 
destroy illicitly cultivated plants. Reflecting 
a more draconian attitude to consumption: 
‘Traditional practice, including widespread 
traditional medicinal use of all three plants, 
was defined as ”quasi-medical” practice that 
had to be terminated’115 while Article 33 set 
out that parties to the Convention ‘shall not 
permit the possession of drugs except under 
legal authority.’ Article 36 mandated the 
adoption of harsh state measures to counter 
engagement in any aspects of the illicit trade: 
Subject to its constitutional limitations, 
each Party shall adopt such measures as 
will ensure that cultivation, production, 
manufacture, extraction, preparation, 
possession, offering, offering for sale, 
distribution, purchase, sale, delivery on 
any terms whatsoever, brokerage, dispatch, 
dispatch in transit, transport, importation 
and exportation of drugs contrary to the 
provisions of this Convention, and any other 
action which in the opinion of such Party 
may be contrary to the provisions of this 
Convention, shall be punishable offences 
when committed intentionally, and that 
serious offences shall be liable to adequate 
punishment particularly by imprisonment 
or other penalties of deprivation of liberty. 
As during the inter-war period, the control 
regime framed by the 1961 Convention 
prioritised eradication of illicit raw plant 
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materials and it side-lined the dangers 
posed by derivatives and pharmaceuticals 
synthesized from organic chemicals. This was 
despite evidence in the 1950s of the emerging 
synthetics problem, as outlined by McAllister:
Synthetically produced, non-narcotic 
substances such as barbiturates, tranquilizers, 
amphetamines and certain hallucinogens 
entered into therapeutic use with ever 
increasing frequency […] Pharmaceutical 
companies, intent on recovering research 
and development costs and reaping profits, 
aggressively marketed the new compounds.116 
The WHO raised concerns that these 
substances had serious abuse potential 
and there was additionally pressure from 
cultivating countries (in particular Turkey) 
for inclusion of synthetics and derivatives in 
the 1961 Convention. This was again resisted 
by the pharmaceutical lobby, reflecting for 
critics of the control model the inherent bias 
of the regime. McAllister highlights the double 
standards of the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, which was established in 1946 as the 
United Nations’ central drug policy-making 
body with responsibility for analysing the 
world drug situation and developing proposals 
to strengthen the international drug control 
system. The CND was ‘so quick to institute 
controls over narcotic substances’ (including 
the synthetic opioids developed in wartime) 
and yet ‘refused to take similar precautions 
with psychotropics.’ He concludes that:   
Bowing to their domestic pharmaceutical 
interests, blind to the cultural bias that 
privileged “modern” western drugs, and 
not wishing to let producer states off the 
hook concerning the “real problem,” manu-
facturing states shunned the chance to nip 
a potentially serious problem in the bud.117
Although the Single Convention was intended 
as a ‘convention to end all conventions,’118 
it became the bedrock for two subsequent 
treaties.  These were agreed upon in the 
early 1970s and late 1980s (on the latter see 
Box 3) and both, to differing extents, are 
important for the discussion of synthetics 
within the international control framework. 
To be sure, regarding the former, amid 
evidence of misuse of prescribed stimulant 
and depressant synthetic drugs,119 there was 
pressure for revision of the treaty system led 
by Sweden and a coalition of cultivator and 
Soviet states. This was achieved through the 
1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances. 
However, in contrast to the strict controls 
imposed on cultivators, traffickers and 
consumers of raw plant narcotics in the 1961 
Convention, the 1971 Convention was liberal 
in provision and application. According 
to UN official Hans Halbach, this can be 
accounted for through reference to the 
pervasive influence of the European and US 
pharmaceutical lobby:
 
The most important manufacturing and 
exporting countries tried everything 
to restrict the scope of control to the 
minimum and weaken the control measures 
in such a way that they should not hinder 
the free international trade.120
They were largely successful. The 1971 
Convention made no reference to derivatives, 
which accounted for 95% of the substances 
created by pharmaceutical firms.121 Only 32 
named compounds spread across four schedules 
of control were listed in the 1971 Convention, 
resulting in a ‘toothless’ document that was 
confusing and oblique in its language – most 
specifically the term ‘psychotropic’. This 
appears to be essentially an administrative, 
functional term with little if any pharmacological 
reference; the claim that it signifies drugs that 
operate on the central nervous system applies 
equally well to the term ‘narcotic’.122 Even 
after ratification, pharmaceutical interests and 
government lobbies from the United States, the 
United Kingdom, Canada, Austria, Denmark, 
West Germany, Switzerland, The Netherlands 
and Belgium, worked to delimit the scope and 
application of the Convention.123  Summing up 
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the situation in their seminal 1975 work, The 
Gentlemen’s Club: International Control of Drugs 
and Alcohol, the Scandinavian scholars Kettil 
Brunn, Lyn Pan and Ingemar Rexed observed, 
…the system has been unable to adjust 
to the changing world situation: the 
rapid development and increased use of 
psychotropics…[have] not been accompanied 
by corresponding modifications in the 
international response.  The system 
has thus lost its social relevance, moral 
strength and scientific thrust. Even though 
there were reasons for neglecting alcohol, 
this cannot be said of ‘psychotropics’: in 
contrast to the vigour of efforts to bring 
new synthetic opiates under control, the 
process of enacting controls over the 
‘psychotropic’ drugs has been marked by 
hesitation and legalistic quibbling.124 
Shaping the Post-War Illicit Market
The Conventions of 1961 and 1971 did not 
arrest a trend of rising demand for, or supply of 
naturally occurring and synthetic drugs. A range 
of factors accounted for the strengthening of 
consumer markets in the liberal democracies of 
capitalist Western Europe and North America. 
They include rebellion by the post war ‘baby 
boomer’ generation,130 secularisation, material 
affluence, the transformation of gender roles, 
and evolving social, musical and counter-
cultural fashions. These in turn normalised 
levels of cannabis, cocaine and heroin use among 
certain social groups that were unprecedented 
in the control period. In the UK for example, 
there were an estimated one million cannabis 
users in 1969.131 In the US, the earliest survey 
data on cannabis use was a 1967 telephone poll 
of college students conducted by Gallup. This 
Box 3: Precursors and the 1988 Convention 
Precursor chemicals are, broadly speaking, chemicals utilised in the production of drugs, 
including synthetics.125  Many of the chemicals employed in the illicit manufacture of narcotic 
drugs and psychotropic substances are derived from legitimate sources and transactions, and the 
control apparatus seeks to disrupt the illicit market by targeting these points of intersection.126  
The control of precursors is included in the provisions of the United Nations Convention against 
Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances of 1988. The instrument’s general 
requirements are contained in paragraph I of article 12, which states that:
‘The parties shall take the measures they deem appropriate to prevent diversion of substances 
in Table I and Table II used for the purpose of illicit manufacture of narcotic drugs or psychotropic 
substances, and shall co-operate with one another to this end.’127 
Tables 1 and 2 act as the control schedules into which substances are assigned, ostensibly 
according to their degree of associated risk. Table 1, for example, comprises acetic anhydride, 
used in the illicit production of heroin.128 
The INCB is mandated with the monitoring of governments controls over precursor chemicals, 
and it recommends on scheduling to the CND. At the recent 60th CND in March 2017, for 
example, the INCB had recommended controls to be imposed upon ANPP and NPP, two fentanyl 
precursors were voted by CND to controlled under Table 1 of the 1988 Convention.129 As 
a consequence of their dual use, and in a similar fashion to negotiations around the 1971 
Convention, discussions around precursor control invariably involve commercial considerations 
of Commission members.  
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found a 5% lifetime prevalence of cannabis use, 
rising to 22% in 1969. By 1971, 51% of surveyed 
college students reported lifetime use, and 
rates for annual and thirty-day prevalence 
were 41% and 30% respectively.132
Referring to the situation in the USA, according to 
Goode and Ben-Yahuda: ‘The 1970s represented 
something of a high-water mark in both the use 
and the public acceptance and tolerance of 
illegal drugs’ with eleven states, representing 
a third of the US population decriminalizing 
small-quantity cannabis possession. In 1979, 
60% of American high school seniors had used 
cannabis at least once during their lifetimes, 
51% had used it during the previous month and 
10% used cannabis daily. Moreover: ‘Tolerance 
and use of a number of the other illegal 
drugs, while not nearly so widespread as with 
marijuana, were at unprecedented levels.’ 
And, as discussed above (New Psychoactive 
Substances) neither the Single Convention of 
1961 nor the 1971 Convention dis-incentivised 
demand for synthetic drugs such as the 
stimulant amphetamine, the dissociative drug 
Phencyclidine (PCP, Angel Dust), depressants 
such as barbiturates and the hallucinogenic LSD. 
The other principle factor driving consumption 
was supply. The 1961 Convention transformed 
shrubs, weeds and poppies into high value 
commodities, with value added relative to the 
risks posed by enforcement. Such were the 
financial rewards generated by criminalisation, 
success in reducing illicit cultivation in one 
country or region led market share to be 
absorbed by competitors.  This was initially 
evidenced in the displacement of opium poppy 
cultivation from China, the world’s leading 
cultivator, to the so called Golden Triangle 
countries of Thailand, Burma and Laos in the 
1950s following the anti-opium campaigns of 
the Mao’s revolutionary regime. The decline 
of illicit supply from China had the additional 
effect of spurring opium cultivation in Turkey. 
As Turkey and Thailand embraced eradication 
and alternative development strategies in the 
1970s and early 1980s, the shortfall in illicit 
supply was taken up by Pakistan and Iran 
and increased supply from Burma. Mexico 
also emerged as a significant source to the 
US, supplementing Turkey as the supply of 
89% of US heroin by the mid-1970s.133 These 
illicit market dynamics made the 15-year 
opium eradication schedule set out in the 1961 
Convention unfeasible. 
Cocaine markets were relatively muted until 
the 1970s, when disco replaced the counter-
cultural movements of the 1960s and narco-
entrepreneurs such as Bolivia’s Roberto Suarez 
Gomez, the so called King of Cocaine, identified 
new market opportunities in the US. Working 
with a Colombian cannabis trafficking gang 
that subsequently evolved into the Medellin 
‘cartel’, Suarez was generating an estimated 
$400m per annum in US cocaine sales by the 
late 1970s.134 By the 1980s, production of illicit 
dry coca leaf increased to 300,000 tonnes135 
with 40 countries reporting cocaine seizures 
to UN drug control authorities in 1980s. 
Mirroring the balloon effect in opium 
economies, coca eradication efforts in Bolivia 
in the mid-1980s led by the US under Operation 
Blast Furnace and national level eradication 
initiatives such as Plan Dignidad increased the 
value of cocaine by reducing available supply.136 
Cultivation was subsequently displaced to Peru, 
which absorbed the lucrative illicit market 
share. By 1990, after five years of intense 
and militarised US enforcement efforts, the 
number of countries reporting cocaine 
seizures had more than doubled to 87 while 
Peru had become the world’s leading illicit 
coca cultivator, responsible for 61% of supply. 
As with the 1961 Convention, the 1971 Treaty did 
much to stimulate the emergence of a criminal 
market for psychoactive drugs as diversion 
from licit pharmaceutical supply declined. 
In 1979, for example, Alpha-methylfentanyl 
or ‘synthetic heroin’, an analogue of the 
pharmaceutical analgesic fentanyl, was 
distributed in California. Henderson outlines 
the ramifications of this development: 
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Now, for the first time, illicit laboratories 
were producing original drugs. This new drug 
was not an illicit copy of a pharmaceutical, 
and therefore, had not been subjected to 
toxicological studies or clinical evaluation 
in human subjects. Further, even though 
alpha-methylfentanyl was chemically and 
pharmacologically nearly identical to 
fentanyl (alpha-methylfentanyl is twice as 
potent as fentanyl), it was technically a new 
drug entity, not on the DEA’s list of restricted 
drugs, and therefore a legal drug.137  
Following deaths linked to Alpha-
methylfentanyl, the compound was placed 
on the US Schedule of Controls in 1981, by 
which time another fentanyl analog para-
fluorofentanyl was in circulation, followed 
in 1984 by alpha-methyl acetylfentanyl. This 
differed from alpha-methylfentanyl by only 
one methyl group but was technically a new 
chemical entity and therefore not subject to 
control. Similarly, 3-methylfentanyl powder, 
which was estimated to be 6000 times more 
potent than morphine and which contributed 
to a spike of 110 fentanyl related deaths in 
California in 1984, predominantly young, blue 
collar males.  Indicative of trends that have 
emerged in the current NPS market, fentanyls 
quickly ‘disappeared’ from the streets 
according to Henderson, to be replaced with 
‘a collection of even more exotic analogs’. 
This included MDMA Ecstasy, use of which 
reached ‘epidemic levels’ in countries such as 
the UK, Netherlands, Australasia and the USA 
in the 1990s, the latter experiencing an 800% 
increase in use between 1996 and 2001.138 
As MDMA Ecstasy was incrementally brought 
under national and international control, new 
synthetic drugs such as ‘Love Hearts’139 came 
onto the market. Writing with some prescience 
in 1988, Henderson concluded: 
…it is likely that the future drugs of abuse 
will be synthetics rather than plant products. 
They will be synthesized from readily 
available chemicals, may be derivatives 
of pharmaceuticals, will be very potent, 
and often very selective in their action. 
In addition, they will be marketed very 
cleverly […] The “Designer Drug” problem 
may become an international problem. A 
single gram of any very potent drug like 
3-methylfentanyl could be synthesized at 
one location, transported to distribution 
sites worldwide, and then formulated (cut) 
into many thousand, perhaps a million, 
doses. Preventing the distribution of such 
small amounts of the pure drug will be 
exceedingly difficult […] Locating these 
laboratories will also be a difficult task. 
When very potent chemicals are produced, 
a clandestine laboratory need operate for 
only a short time to make a few hundred 
grams of material. 140
Synthetic markets also showed the same 
tendency to geographical displacement as 
demonstrated in coca and opium cultivating 
areas. In the case of methamphetamine in the 
US, Ryan Grim relates that:
 
As California tightened its border in 
response to both drug smuggling and illegal 
immigration in the nineties, the drug runners 
gradually moved east - making access to 
the Midwest much easier. “The eastward 
expansion of the drug took a particular 
toll on central states such as Arkansas, 
Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, 
and Nebraska,” noted the government’s 
2006 National Drug Threat Assessment. The 
Midwestern methedemic, as it came to be 
dubbed, was soon on full display.141
Nevertheless, synthetics were not prioritised 
in the research or funding of international 
drug control institutions, or in the US, the lead 
actor on global counter narcotics activity.142 
Rather, as discussed in the following section, 
there was a redoubling of efforts in the 1980s 
to eliminate raw narcotic plant materials. 
Preliminary explanations for this lopsided and 
deficient performance is that the potential 
popularity of synthetics was underestimated; 
manufacture was seen to be containable 
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as source was assumed to be focused on six 
or seven super-labs;143 the financial value of 
the synthetic market was lower than that of 
cocaine and heroin, and because the locus 
of manufacture was the Global North. The 
effect of this ‘locking down’ on raw narcotics 
in the 1980s was to create an enabling 
environment for the expansion of synthetics, 
while at the same time generating unintended 
consequences in cocaine and heroin markets 
that would preoccupy drug control authorities 
in the 1990s and 2000s – again, largely to the 
neglect of synthetic market growth.
3 POST-COLD WAR MARKETS AND THE 
SYNTHETIC SURGE
Building on the ‘ideological and institutional 
groundwork laid by previous presidents’, 
particularly President Nixon,144 the 
administration of President Ronald Reagan 
(1981-1989) instituted  a dramatic shift in 
control efforts and engaged the US in a 
now well-documented ‘nationwide crusade 
against drugs, a sustained, relentless effort 
to rid America of this scourge.’145 This was 
underpinned by a tightening and robust 
application of punitive criminal sanctions 
against users and distributors of illicit drugs in 
the US, and militarisation of eradication and 
interdiction efforts overseas that specifically 
focused on the Latin American cocaine trade. 
Reflecting the political malleability of the 
concept of ‘national security’, illicit narcotics 
were reconceptualised as a threat to the 
US and thus legitimised a ‘war’ on drugs, 
with a related allocation of resourcing and 
responsibility for counter narcotics to defence 
related budgets and institutions. As Ethan 
Nadelmann has noted, ‘Defining transnational 
drug trafficking as a national security threat 
jibed neatly with the rhetoric of the “war on 
drugs” during the 1980s.’146  Furthermore, such 
conceptual conflation reflected a more general 
‘domestication of US foreign policy during the 
1980s and into the 1990s’147 with drugs emerging 
as an example of an important foreign-domestic 
policy ‘nexus’ (or ‘intermestic’) issue area.148 
As a consequence, between 1982 and 1992 the 
portion of the US drug enforcement budget 
commanded by the Department of Defense 
increased from $4.9 million to $1 billion, 
dropping to $700 million in 1995.149  
Explaining the War on Coca & Cocaine
Within this context, beginning in 1983, US 
Special Forces were dispatched to the Andes 
to provide counter narcotics training to local 
security officials. After drug trafficking was 
declared a ‘lethal threat’ in a 1986 National 
Security Decision Directive, there was direct 
deployment of US forces in overseas counter 
narcotics efforts, commencing in July 1986 
with Operation Blast Furnace in Bolivia.150 As 
Jelsma details, that year was also significant 
for the introduction of ‘king pin’ legislation 
targeting ‘cartel’ leaders overseas, and the de-
certification exercise under which countries 
deemed uncooperative in counter narcotics 
efforts were sanctioned by the US rescinding 
of foreign lending and development assistance: 
 
The procedure for inclusion was highly 
politicised, effectively working as a 
compliance mechanism to coerce countries 
to carry out the forced eradication of a 
specified number of hectares; tighten drug 
laws and arrest quotas: accept extradition 
of national citizens to the United States; 
or to refrain from adopting less repressive 
policies (as was the case in Jamaica when 
cannabis decriminalisation appeared on 
the political agenda).151 
A neat explanation for the escalation of US 
counter narcotics efforts during the1980s, 
especially the mid- to late years of that 
decade, a period that saw the increase role 
of the US military in the war in drugs via both 
the Omnibus Drug Control Act of 1986 and the 
1989 Defence Authorization Act, relates to 
the collapse of Soviet communism.  It should 
be recalled how the ending of the Cold War 
removed the geostrategic rationale for US 
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engagement with, and presence in, a host of 
third countries that had traditionally been 
justified through reference to anti-communism 
and the defence of democracy. Accordingly, 
it might be argued that the refocusing of 
counter narcotics activities was driven by the 
need to reallocate redundant military and 
intelligence activities, with drugs substituting 
for communism as a means of perpetuating 
US overseas military presence and bilateral 
defence and intelligence activities. That said, 
Reagan’s militarisation of supply side counter 
narcotics activities preceded the Soviet collapse 
and they were undertaken without knowledge 
of the pending implosion of the Soviet model. 
As such, while there was certainly an important 
convergence between the changing direction of 
US drug policy and the end of the Cold War - be 
it defined as 1989 when the Berlin Wall came 
down or 1991 and the collapse of the Soviet 
Union – the relationship is more complicated 
than it might first appear. 
It seems likely that several inter-related 
factors need to be considered within what 
was a refocusing process, rather than a 
single trigger, straddling the point where the 
longstanding geopolitical landscape shifted 
with the end of the Cold War.  Indeed, for 
Nadelmann, the period represented a fusion, 
or more accurately ‘re-fusion’, of ‘US criminal 
justice and US national security concerns’.152 
As he describes, ‘During the 1980s…drug 
trafficking, traditionally a criminal justice 
concern, was placed on the national security 
agenda by the White House, Congress and in 
a formal sense,’ as noted above, ‘a National 
Security Directive.’ Consequently, Nadelmann 
continues, ‘During the mid-1980s, both the 
US military and the intelligence agencies 
reoriented their priorities, often reluctantly, 
to devote attention to drug trafficking, money 
laundering, and other criminal activities 
that they previously had largely ignored.’ 
After the end of the Cold War in the early 
1990s, ‘this reorientation had progressed 
substantially, driven by both the emergence of 
advocates within the military and intelligence 
bureaucracies and by the general search for 
new agendas and objectives to fill the void 
left by the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the international communist threat.’ To be 
sure, writing in 1993 Nadelmann asserts, 
‘[Where once anticommunism represented the 
principle moral imperative of US foreign policy, 
drug enforcement and other criminal justice 
objectives have emerged as the new moral 
imperatives.’153 Moreover, anti-drug operations 
could be seen to justify continued US presence 
in many parts of the world after the removal of 
the Communist threat.
Exactly why both the Executive Office and 
the US Congress became more interested in 
the drug issue during the 1980s, including 
an increased emphasis on the longstanding 
practice  of ‘externalizing’ the sources of the 
US drug problem,154 is also a complex issue. 
It is, plausible to suggest that three factors, 
or a combination thereof, should therefore 
be considered in attempting to explain the 
dramatic change in US conduct. The first is 
electoral politics and changing public sentiment 
towards what was increasingly deemed to be 
promiscuous drug use. Survey data revealed 
rising popular concern with illicit drug use in 
the US and specifically crack cocaine, which 
was identified by 42% of Americans surveyed in 
1986 as the most serious problem drug.155 The 
number of respondents seeing drugs as the most 
serious problem facing US society also increased 
during this decade. In polling by the New York 
Times and CBS News 13% of respondents saw 
drugs as a major social problem in 1986. By 
1989, this had risen to 64%.156 
While it can be argued that the Reagan 
administration was responding to public 
pressure, critics maintain that the relationship 
between government and electorate was in 
fact the reverse, with the Federal government 
and the national media conspiring to create a 
‘moral panic’.  According to Erich Goode and 
Nachman Ben-Yahuda: 
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The concern at that time had been fuelled 
by a barrage of network news programs on 
drug abuse […] In short, by the late 1980s, 
drug abuse had attained what Hilgartner 
and Bosk refer to as a “celebrity” status. 157
In this interpretation the focus on drugs was a 
means of deflecting attention from the harsh 
social costs of economic austerity in the US 
during the 1980s contextualised within a 
broader shift toward conservative values.158 
Moreover, the trend of privatising criminal 
justice and counter narcotics enforcement 
to private providers pursued by the Reagan 
presidency generated powerful financial 
incentives to adopt a draconian and ‘hard-
line’ approach of incarceration of domestic 
offenders and militarisation of overseas 
eradication efforts.  
A second, more benign explanation for the 
Reagan strategy relates to the 25-year 
schedule for illicit coca cultivation elimination 
set out in the 1961 Single Convention. As this 
deadline approached, illicit coca cultivation 
was reaching historic highs in Bolivia and Peru 
where an estimated 200,000 tonnes of illicit 
dry coca leaf was cultivated in 1986. According 
to the US government’s Office of National Drug 
Control Policy:
Until the mid-1960s, global cocaine 
seizures were measured in the tens of 
kilograms annually. In recent years, they 
have been in the hundreds of tons. Based 
on seizure figures, it appears that cocaine 
markets grew most dramatically during the 
1980s, when the amounts seized increased 
by more than 40% per year.159
From this perspective, it might be argued that 
the escalation of eradication efforts by the US 
government was intended to demonstrate the 
viability of supply-side prohibition-oriented 
policies and the integrity of the treaty system. 
A third possible explanation relates to the 
geopolitics of Latin America, a region defined 
by the US through the 1823 Monroe Doctrine as 
its sphere of influence. The 1980s was a period 
of political transition in Latin America as right 
wing military authoritarian regimes either 
collapsed (for example Argentina) or negotiated 
their exit from power (for example Chile and 
Brazil). Facilitating the re-democratisation 
process was the decision by the second Reagan 
administration to retract support for regional 
dictatorships that had legitimised themselves 
in power through reference to threats of 
communist insurgency and takeover. Support 
for these brutal regimes contradicted the shift 
to democracy promotion in Reagan’s second 
term foreign policy, and the institutional 
support provided by the Federal government 
to initiatives such as the National Endowment 
for Democracy. The geographic attention of 
the Federal government also shifted during this 
second term, from the large countries of the 
Southern Cone to Central America, and efforts 
to roll back Nicaragua’s Sandinista Revolution. 
However, the cost of terminating support for 
Latin America’s military establishment was 
reduced influence over the region’s security 
agenda, defence spending, and training of 
security officials. In this context, it can be 
argued that counter narcotics served as a tool 
to redefine hemispheric defence interests 
and to reassert US dominance over newly 
democratic administrations. Moreover, the 
popular conservative discourse against drugs 
fed into the militarisation of US counter-
narcotics operations in Latin America, and 
provided a new legitimacy to the expansion of 
US military action in the region.160 Discussing 
the connections between the end of the Cold 
War and drugs within the region Ted Galen 
Carpenter notes, ‘The war against drugs was 
not a perfect substitute for the fading Cold 
War, but it had several characteristics that 
could help sustain a large national security 
bureaucracy.’  He continues, ‘As did the Cold 
War (and its predecessor World War II), the drug 
cartels provided the image of an utterly evil 
adversary, which provoked a visceral response 
of hostility in most Americans’.  ‘In addition’, 
Carpenter concludes, ‘just as the Cold War’s 
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ideological component frequently served as 
a pretext for US intervention in the Third 
World in pursuit of more mundane political 
and economic objectives, so too the drug war 
could become a cover for renewed activism – 
especially in the Western Hemisphere’. 161    
Post-Cold War Continuity
As discussed in Section 2, the strategy of 
forced eradication pursued in Bolivia led to the 
displacement of coca cultivation to Peru. This 
was just one of multiple unintended negative 
consequences resulting from Reagan’s ‘war 
on drugs’ initiative. The Federal governments 
drug ‘king pin’ legislation that was intended 
to decapitate the leadership of foreign drug 
‘cartels’, and the annual de-certification 
exercise of foreign governments served to 
escalate violence in the drug cultivating and 
trafficking states of Latin America as powerful 
drug gangs confronted national governments 
weakened by US pressure and tactics of 
isolation. ‘Blowback’ from Reagan’s counter 
narcotics policies created a pretext for the 
subsequent George H. W. Bush and William 
Clinton administrations to deepen US military 
engagement in Latin American states in the 
altered international context of the post-Cold 
War era.162 Consequently, as the domestic 
synthetic market mushroomed in the US 
with Ecstasy MDMA use reaching record highs, 
Federal government attention remained chiefly 
focused overseas and on cocaine production 
in the Global South.  Writing in 1997, Peter 
Andreas pointed out that the ‘problems with 
adopting the language, strategies and tools of 
military deterrence has helped to perpetuate 
the convenient policy myths that the primary 
source’ of the US drug problem ‘is foreign 
supply rather than America’s’ addiction to 
psychoactive substances.163 
Indeed, even as the US the drug control 
bureaucracies acknowledged the growing 
markets for synthetic drugs, there remained 
a tendency to highlight overseas sources.  For 
example, during the mid-2000s under the 
Bush administration, the State Department’s 
Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL) reported on the 
production of pseudoephedrine in Canada, 
used for making methamphetamine which was 
then trafficked into the US, and of Ecstasy 
bound for the same destination. Commenting 
on synthetic drugs, the same INL report had 
this to say:
The relative ease and low cost of 
manufacturing ATS drugs from readily 
available chemicals appeals as much to 
small drug entrepreneurs as to the large 
international syndicates. Since they do not 
rely on organic sources such as coca and 
opium poppy, synthetics allow individual 
trafficking organizations to control the 
whole process, from manufacture to sale on 
the street. Synthetics can be made anywhere 
and offer enormous profit margins.164 
In 1988, the active participation of the 
US military in counter narcotics efforts 
was expanded by the George H. W. Bush 
administration through Public Law 100-456. 
This made the Department of Defence the 
lead agency for the monitoring of aerial and 
maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United 
States and authorised the Secretary of Defense 
to make military equipment and facilities 
available for law enforcement authorities. The 
law additionally authorized the Department of 
Defence to provide the resources ‘sufficient 
to pay for all expenses of the National 
Guard of such State when engaged in drug 
interdiction assistance activities.’ As outlined 
by Jelsma, this vastly increased the number 
of military personnel and assets dedicated 
to counter-narcotics efforts, underpinned 
by a quadrupling of funding for military drug 
interdiction missions.165
  
There was a shift in funding and strategic focus 
under President William Clinton in relation to 
the cocaine trade. Under the 1993 Presidential 
Decision Directive 14, US interdiction efforts 
led by the Southern Command through the Joint 
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Interagency Task Force-East in Key West was 
reoriented from transit zones in the Caribbean 
and Gulf of Mexico back to the source country 
focus of the Reagan period. The Directive 
incorporated into US counter narcotics efforts 
military assets that included US Air Force AWACS, 
US Navy P-3 Orion and E2-C Hawkeye radar 
aircraft and a network of ground-based radars 
operated by the Joint Southern Surveillance 
Reconnaissance Operations Centre. At the 
same time, and under pressure from the US 
de-certification exercise, Colombian and 
Peruvian governments authorised the use of 
deadly force against aircraft engaged in drug 
trafficking. The US Department of Defense was 
involved in the 1993 air-to-air tracker program 
with a $35 million budget for the lease and 
subsequent purchase of T-47 trainer aircraft 
from the US Navy. These were replaced after 
1995 with the purchase of 5 Cessna Citation 
aircraft under the Defence Appropriations Act. 
By the late 1990s, the main theatre of military 
anti-drugs operations in Latin America was 
Colombia under the framework of Plan 
Colombia negotiated between Clinton and 
Colombian president Andres Pastrana. This $6 
billion programme made Colombia the third 
largest recipient of US foreign assistance, 
with the bulk of the resources supporting the 
counter narcotics battalions of the Colombian 
armed forces, including through the provision 
of ‘84 helicopters (UH-60 Blackhawks and UH-
1H Hueys), patrol boats, communications and 
intelligence-gathering equipment, small arms, 
and grants of cargo and attack aircraft.’166
In explaining continuity of the militarised 
approach into the 1990s Jelsma maintains 
that the ‘war on drugs’ served to justify 
continuity of defence spending after the end 
of the Cold War:  
At that moment in history when anti-
communist rationale for maintaining high 
military budgets and operations abroad 
was questioned after the Berlin Wall came 
down in 1989 the Pentagon was given a 
significant anti-drugs role. According to an 
Air Force analyst involved in counterdrug 
missions, the “timing for large-scale 
military involvement was excellent: the 
Cold War was drawing to a close, freeing 
up large amounts of assets.167 
 
Another benefit of the ‘drug war’ to successive 
Federal governments was in providing 
continuity in US foreign policy in the post-
Cold War era, and as the Bush and Clinton 
administrations deferred ‘difficult decisions 
about priorities and purposes’ in other areas 
of foreign policy. According to Jeremi Suri: 
The 1990s were ‘‘lost years’’ for strategy 
not because of a conscious decision to avoid 
strategy articulation […] The United States 
no longer confronted a clear adversary 
(the Soviet Union) or a rival ideology 
(communism) […] Suddenly removed, they 
left policymakers adrift. The new threats to 
American interests were both more defuse 
and more numerous. They were difficult to 
think about in systematic terms, ranging 
from rogue states to anarchical societies, 
with warlords and terrorists in-between. 
Strategists had to make a cake from crumbs—
to find some coherent unity in a fragmented, 
incoherent post-Cold War world. 168
The utility of overseas drug wars lay in 
enabling the US to exert leverage over distant 
societies in an altered international context, 
while the decline of a competing superpower 
allowed the US to operate unilaterally on 
drug policy. 
Like the US, European countries also focused 
their attention predominantly on overseas 
supply rather than domestic manufacture of 
synthetics and the growth of local ATS markets 
in the 1990s. However, in contrast to the 
militarised approach of the US, the European 
strategy was largely focused on support 
for Alternative Development programmes, 
multilateral dialogue with Latin American 
states on drug-related issues, development 
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assistance through grants, loans and debt 
swaps, and security sector capacity training. 
Funding was dispersed through bilateral and 
multilateral mechanisms that made European 
Union (EU) assistance both complex and 
dissipated. While the European countries 
took a different approach to the US, cohering 
around poverty and under-development as 
the drivers of drug crop cultivation, their 
actions reinforced the primacy of raw 
narcotic materials in international counter 
narcotics efforts, while at the same time their 
interventions exacerbated existing problems 
of corruption and a lack of transparency in 
fiscal disbursements, weak civilian oversight of 
the security sector, and displacement of drug 
crops in Latin American countries.   
It could be argued that the strategic approach 
of both the US and the EU was informed by 
the massive expansion of cocaine and heroin 
markets in the 1990s, and by the role that 
these drugs played in funding the intra-
state wars and insurgencies of the period. 
As has been extensively documented, the 
end of ‘superpower’ funding required rebel 
organisations that had previously benefitted 
from state-sponsorship to raise alternative 
revenue sources. Running parallel with this 
was the emergence of insurgent groups 
articulating ethic, religious and nationalist 
grievances following the collapse of the Cold 
War political architecture. This, according to 
some researchers, included organisations as 
diverse as the Afghan Taliban,169 Colombian 
FARC, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, 
the Real IRA and the Kurdish Workers Party.170 
In the context of expanding markets for illicit 
drugs, sustained demand, and newly globalised 
transportation networks, cocaine and opioids 
became a ‘lootable resource’171 with finances 
variously raised through taxation levied 
for protection of cultivators, landing strips, 
laboratories and transportation of drugs. 
Where cocaine and opioids did not directly 
finance conflict, the impact of conflict indirectly 
impacted on trafficking networks and routes. 
This was exemplified by the Balkans, where 
disruption of illicit heroin supply from Turkey 
to Western Europe through Serbia, Croatia, and 
Slovenia led to a re-routing through Albania, 
Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. The UNODC 
identified Kosovo Albanian and Serbian organized 
crime groups as controlling the ‘new’ heroin 
market, which was increasingly augmented by 
cocaine as a result of closer cooperation with 
Latin American criminal organisations.172 Balkan 
countries were additionally a key transit point 
for Afghan opioids. In his 1995 address to the 
United Nations, US President Clinton highlighted: 
…the growing nexus between terrorists, 
narcotics traffickers and other 
international criminals that has been 
fostered by developments in international 
communications, travel and information-
sharing, and the end of the Cold War. 173
This nexus informed US and EU / Organization 
for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
counter terrorism strategy into the 2000s, 
an approach that was underpinned by the 
assumption that narcotics sustained conflict. 
Within this security framework, combatting 
raw plant narcotics at source through either 
eradication or alternative development was 
seen as a means of debilitating insurgent 
groups and detracting support from these 
organisations by generating alternative 
livelihoods. In turn, this legitimised 
ever deepening military engagement and 
development assistance in cultivator states 
and subsequently along trafficking routes. 
Jelsma concludes that:     
 
In hindsight, the war on drugs can be 
seen as a transition between the Cold 
War and the War on Terror, in terms of 
legitimising military operations, bases and 
interventions abroad.174 
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Explaining Post-Cold War Market Growth  
Raw narcotic plants cultivated in the Global 
South have remained the central preoccupation 
of the drug control system. The academic and 
development community have reinforced this 
focus on raw narcotic plants, further detracting 
attention from synthetic markets. The study 
of the inter-relationship between cocaine, 
opium and heroin on the one hand and conflict, 
terrorism and under development on the other 
dominated scholarly and official reports in the 
1990s and 2000s.175 This became entrenched 
as the global peace and security narrative 
addressed post conflict reconstruction and 
the drug trade as a driver of weak and failing 
states. Comparing the literatures on the 
drug economies of Colombia and Afghanistan 
to the research and analysis conducted on 
synthetic drugs shows a remarkable skewing 
of attention away from synthetics and chronic 
under-investigation of the social harms and 
criminality with which they are linked. 
It can be argued that this imbalance in attention 
and resources is merited as synthetics do not 
pose the same security and development 
risks as cocaine and opioids. However due 
to the lack of research on synthetics, this 
assertion cannot be empirically proven, most 
particularly as it relates to public health and 
organised crime. While it is the case that the 
US and Netherlands as leading synthetic drug 
manufacturers are not as debilitated by the 
illicit trade as developing countries – hence 
synthetics are more structurally benign in their 
impacts, a reverse view is that this stability is 
a factor of the lack of domestically focused, 
militarised counter narcotics activity and 
illicit market disruption. In this respect, the 
trade in heroin and cocaine remain a security 
and development problem in the Global South 
precisely because of the counter-productive 
impacts of policy responses instigated in the 
North. This has been explored in multiple 
publications, with specific reference to the 
negative impacts of counter narcotics policy. 
Here it is discussed in relation to the strategies 
for economic and political liberalisation that 
were pursued in the 1990s and which, like 
counter narcotics responses, were devised in 
the North and imposed on countries of the 
Global South. As demonstrated below, these 
drove expansion of raw narcotic markets in the 
Cold War era, in turn perpetuating heroin and 
cocaine as the focus of drug control efforts and 
implementation of externally devised supply 
side oriented responses. 
Economic and Political Liberalisation
According to Suri,176 markets and democracies 
became the solution to all foreign policy 
problems for Presidents Bush and Clinton 
in the 1990s. Lacking a grand strategy for 
shaping a safer and more stable international 
system in the post containment era,177 both 
expounded the neoliberal virtues of free trade 
and democratic enlargement, as represented 
by the so-called ‘Clinton Doctrine’.178 While 
intended to promote prosperity, security and 
a democratic peace in the post-Cold War 
era, these measures created an environment 
conducive to the expansion of naturally 
occurring and also synthetic drugs. 
First, the social hardship generated by the 
application of the Washington consensus179 of 
neoliberal inspired stabilisation and structural 
adjustment measures (SAPs) rendered 
employment in illicit cultivation, manufacturing 
and trafficking a rational option for the 
unemployed and informal sector workers in the 
1980s and 1990s. Highlighting the trauma of the 
SAP process O’Donnell argued that:
 
The social situation of Latin America is 
a scandal. In 1990 about 46% of Latin 
Americans lived in poverty. Close to half 
of these are indigents who lack the means 
to satisfy very basic human needs. Today 
there are more poor than in the early 
1970s: a total, in 1990, of 195 million, 76 
million more than in 1970. These appalling 
numbers include 93 million indigents, 28 
million more than in 1970. The problem is 
not just poverty. Equally important is the 
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sharp increase of inequality in most of the 
region […] The rich are richer, the poor and 
indigent have increased.180
In this context, engagement in the illicit drugs 
economy became a livelihoods strategy. 181 In 
Bolivia, where 21,000 jobs were lost in the 
tin sector, the number of illicit cultivators 
expanded from an estimated 7,500 to 40,000 
growers during economic depression in the 
early 1980s followed by the application of 
SAPs that aimed to reduce an inflation rate 
that had reached nearly 10,000% by 1985.182 
In 1991 The Economist estimated that 1 in 
every 3.4 of economically active Bolivians 
found employment in the cocaine economy by 
the early 1990s, while Painter cites a figure of 
between a low of 120,000 to a high of 500,000.183 
Similarly, in Peru an estimated 200,000 people 
or 3% of the EAP were engaged in the coca/ 
cocaine economy in the late 1980s and early 
1990s.184 During this period, Peruvian GDP fell 
by 25%, inflation reached 8,000%, public sector 
wages declined by 83% while social expenditure 
fell from $49 per capita in 1980 to $12 per 
capita in 1990. In both Bolivia and Peru, the 
incentives to enter the illicit economy were 
substantial. Migrant farmers in Peru were paid 
$16 per day to pick coca as opposed to $3 per 
day in formal agricultural employment, while 
in Bolivia the annual income of an illicit coca 
farmer in Chapare was estimated at $5,500 in 
contrast to the $600 average annual income.185 
Reflecting the importance of the illicit market 
in offsetting the impact of economic crisis and 
SAP application, at its highest point in 1987, 
coca / cocaine generated $1.5 billion or 24% 
of Bolivian GNP according to Bolivian statistics 
before falling back to 5.3% in the early 1990s 
as demand and prices flattened owing to the 
increase in supply.186 In Peru, Thoumi cites a 
figure of 11% for coca/cocaine’s contribution 
to the country’s GNP in the 1980s.187 
Conversely, the trauma of economic transition 
and exposure to global markets and lifestyles 
impacted at the consumer end of the drug trade. 
In relation to Russia, where data for first time 
registered drug users increased from 3.9 cases 
per 100,000 in 1991 to 42 cases per 100,000 
inhabitants by 1999, Letizia Paoli sets out that: 
For contemporary Russian urban youth, 
illegal drugs have become a means to 
demonstrate their assimilation to Western 
lifestyles and to display their newly 
obtained freedom of action. Drug use also 
reflects the lack of orientation suffered by 
many Russian teenagers and young adults 
[…] Unable to reach the glamorous aims of 
a society for which wealth is becoming the 
primary and exclusive measure of people’s 
value, young Russians increasingly resort 
to illegal drugs to escape their harsh living 
conditions, to forget their broken dreams, 
and to cope with unemployment. 188
The promotion of economic liberalisation by the 
US, EU and international financial institutions 
and the accompanying processes of global and 
regional integration that were intended to 
support free trade and free markets boosted 
supply and distribution chains. This was to the 
benefit of the illicit trade. For example, the 
lifting of border restrictions in contexts as 
diverse as North America, the former Soviet 
Union and South-East Asia facilitated transit of 
illicit drugs and chemical precursors. In relation 
to the former Soviet Union, Paoli189 notes that: 
…the opening of borders and the liberalization 
of trade have triggered a veritable boom 
of illegal markets. In particular, since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, a phenomenal 
expansion of illegal drug consumption and 
trade has taken place in Russia, as in most 
other countries of the former Warsaw Pact. 
Due to travel and trade restrictions, the 
former Soviet Union neither constituted 
a single drug market nor participated 
significantly in international narcotic 
exchanges as a consumer or supplier of 
illicit substances. However, this pattern of 
relative self-sufficiency drastically changed 
during the 1990s […] Large quantities of 
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illegal drugs today transit through the 
Russian territory to reach final consumers 
in Western and Eastern Europe. The growing 
domestic demand is also increasingly fed 
by more powerful and easier-to-use drugs 
imported from abroad. Besides expanding 
and tremendously diversifying its supply, the 
Russian drug market has, during the past ten 
years, become truly nationwide, and it now 
reaches even the remotest Siberian cities.
In Mexico, the formation of the North American 
Free Trade Agreement with the US and Canada 
in 1994 created new opportunities for cross 
border movement of drugs. As outlined by Grim: 
In a 1999 report, the White House estimated 
that commercial vehicles brought roughly 
100 tons of cocaine into the country across 
the Mexican border in 1993. With NAFTA 
in effect, 1994 saw the biggest jump in 
commercial-vehicle smuggling on record - a 
25 percent increase. 190
Similarly in Asia the UNODC publication 
‘Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-Type 
Stimulants and Other Drugs: Global SMART 
Programme 2013 Challenges for Asia and the 
Pacific’ outlined: 
 
The increasing pace of regional integration 
in East and Southeast Asia is positively 
facilitating the free flow of goods, services, 
investment, capital and labour […] misuse 
of economic integration for the illicit 
trafficking of drugs and other contraband 
will continue to pose a significant threat to 
security, good governance, human rights and 
sustainable development in the region.191 
The promotion of deregulation and privatisation 
in sectors such as finance, telecoms and 
industry that was generically applied across 
a diversity of country and regional contexts 
was also a spur to the globalisation of illicit 
drug markets. Reining back the role of the 
state in order to free market forces generated 
opportunities for the laundering of drug 
related revenues. Poor oversight and weak 
regulation that extended from privatised 
sectors to investment and foreign exchange 
regimes in the nascent capitalist economies 
allowed drug related finances to be moved 
quickly and opaquely around the world and 
easily laundered into capital assets generating 
grey economies, part licit and part illicit. 
Democratisation and democracy promotion 
strategies that were intended to build a peaceful 
global community of democracies also had the 
unintended consequence of fuelling the illicit 
drug trade. Authoritarian regimes as diverse 
as the Mexican PRI and the communist states 
of East and Central Europe had been effective 
in delimiting the influence of narcotic drugs 
either through exercising intra-regime control 
over the trade and its actors (as in Mexico) or 
by zealously overseeing the borders and private 
lives of nations and citizens. Democratisation 
pressures in a diversity of country contexts 
weakened centralised authoritarian states, and 
the capacity of regimes to contain penetration 
by illicit drug markets. Moving into the 2000s, 
democracy and ‘good governance’ were 
encouraged by the Global North as a means to 
promote development192 and prevent conflict 
and terrorism by channelling the articulation 
of grievance peacefully. This was at the cost 
of fuelling the opportunities for drug market 
expansion, and it enabled actors enriched by 
illicit markets and grey economies to parlay 
their economic power into political influence.   
Consequently, it can be argued that those 
factors that have been used to account for the 
expansion of cocaine and opioid markets in 
the 1990s and 2000s, including regional trade 
and integration processes and democratisation 
similarly account for the expansion of synthetic 
markets. However, these dynamic changes 
have for the most part passed under the radar 
of drug control agencies that have remained 
locked predominantly on raw narcotic plant 
materials and their derivatives. 
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CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS
Deficiencies in knowledge, research and 
institutional ‘early warning’ capacity mean 
that there remains a limited evidence base 
for reorienting drug policy toward the 
acknowledged and serious challenge of ATS 
and NPS.  Moreover, as a result, there is 
little incentive for the Global North and its 
development agencies and, to a lesser extent, 
academic communities to turn their attention 
away from the illicit markets in organic drugs, 
particularly the cocaine and heroin trade. 
In turn, it is difficult to refocus patterns of 
training, funding and research to address 
threats to health and security posed by 
synthetic drugs. This inflexibility is reinforced 
by rigid and lengthy donor programme cycles 
in areas such as alternative development and 
security sector training, which have been the 
backbone of counter narcotics efforts against 
cocaine and opioids in the Global South from 
the 1980s onwards. 
The need to improve the quality of data 
relating to the production, distribution 
and consumption of all drugs was belatedly 
recognised by the Commission on Narcotic 
Drugs, resulting in the 2009 resolution 52/12 
on ‘Improving the collection, reporting and 
analysis of data to monitor the implementation 
of the Political Declaration and Plan of Action 
on International Cooperation towards an 
Integrated and Balanced Strategy to Counter 
the World Drug Problem.’ However, subsequent 
World Drug Reports and SMART assessments 
demonstrate negligible progress in developing 
a comprehensive picture of the synthetic 
market or in the design of appropriate 
interventions. Again, this is partly a result 
of the problem of measurement, stemming 
from the proliferation of sources of synthetic 
drug production as discussed here.  While the 
UNODC’s research into synthetics is expanding 
and increasing its depth, the continuance 
of the process awaits adequate funding and 
initiatives from Member States to achieve 
its objectives. Major gaps in our knowledge 
of the fastest growing, most dynamic and 
globalised of illicit drug markets persist. It 
must be acknowledged how the international 
drug control regime introduced the vocabulary 
of ‘collective responsibility’ in 1984, while 
a resolution adopted at the 1990 UNGASS 
enshrined the term ‘shared responsibility’.193 
The regime has consequently taken up this 
language of ‘shared responsibility’ for the 
causes and perpetuation of the illicit trade, 
as expounded by the UN General Assembly 
of 1990, 1998 and 2016, and in associated 
Political Declarations. Nonetheless, strategy 
has yet to adequately move from declaration 
to formulation of drug policies or a drug 
narrative that reflects this altered landscape. 
Nor have there been shifts in the distribution 
of power, influence and representation within 
international drug control institutions. The 
Global North may now entertain the notion 
that illicit drugs are produced and trafficked 
in its territory, but institutions, language and 
policy are yet to fully reflect the vitality of 
production and distribution in the North, or 
more particularly, the challenges posed by ATS 
and NSPs.  In CND resolutions, the increasing 
attention to ATS and NPS is apparent. Between 
2000 and 2009, five Resolutions were adopted, 
while the figure between 2010 and 2016 was 
seven (CND Decisions are not included here, 
but are discussed above).194 That said, there is 
still some way to go. 
The consequences of not shaping a new narrative 
on the illicit drug trade and fully breaking with 
the traditional North / South paradigm will be 
costly, financially as well as in terms of public 
health, development and security. It will mean 
continuity of cocaine and opioid focused counter-
narcotics programmes that have been shown to 
be counterproductive and which exacerbate 
violence, conflict and insecurity in ‘producer’ 
countries such as Afghanistan, Colombia, Peru 
and Burma, as well as South to North ‘bridge’ 
states in Central America, Sub Saharan Africa 
and Central Asia. In relation to public health, the 
prioritisation of cocaine and opioids has arguably 
served to deepen the mismatch between 
provision and demand in drug treatment.195
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Both ATS and the proliferating substances pose 
a new challenge to the control regime and the 
Parties it comprises. Both of these categories of 
drugs feed enormous, globalised markets, and 
render largely obsolete the old narrative of 
producer, transit and consumer countries. This 
is a historical shift comparable to the movement 
of opium, which had been produced in India and 
fed into a vast market China, and which then 
began flowing out of China in the 1930s to supply 
consumers around the world. There is a parallel, 
at least, with the present situation in east and 
southeast Asia, which produces and supplies 
synthetic drugs for its own region and others.
Perhaps this move to synthetic drugs represents 
a still greater change in the dynamics of the 
illicit or non-medical market, which will 
force us to rethink its basic categories. For 
drugs are no longer tied down to geographical 
sites and the cultivation of crops, but can 
be produced almost anywhere. The dangers 
described in this Report are connected to the 
linkage of drug control to the plant based 
narcotics narrative and its associated policies, 
in the fields of public health, law enforcement 
and data construction. What is required is 
perhaps neither a retention of that model, nor 
a reversal of the narrative, but rather a re-
framing of the regulatory narrative. It remains 
to be seen which way the international 
community turns.  However, at present the 
status quo compels countries of the Global 
South to carry financial and security costs of 
the ‘drug war’ that would be unconscionable 
in countries of the Global North.   
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